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CRIMINAL LAW
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
SCOTT N.

SCHREIBER*

SABIHA MALIK**
JONINA T.

I.

GORENSTEIN***

INTRODUCTION

During the 1983-84 term, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a wide range of criminal law issues. This article will briefly describe some of the important cases which were decided, as well as
articulate the court's posture on the issues presented.
II.

A.

STATUTES ANALYZED

Embezzlement of Federal Funds

The Seventh Circuit broke new ground in United States v. Petullo'
by holding that federal jurisdiction is triggered by the authorization, as
opposed to the expenditure, of federal relief disaster funds obtained
through misrepresentation. 2 While the holding is not directly supported
by precedent, the conclusion is well reasoned and logically extends prior
case law.
Following the record snowfalls in early 1979, President Carter authorized the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration to reimburse
the City of Chicago for two-thirds of certain snow removal costs. 3 The

court of appeals characterized this authorization as "a line of credit"
from the federal government to the city since the city could pay its bills
and then rely on the federal government for reimbursement. 4 Petullo and
his partner submitted false vouchers to the city for snow removal services
they allegedly performed. The city promptly discovered the fraudulent
vouchers before paying any of the commingled federal, state and local
funds designated for snow removal. 5 Petullo and his partner were subseJ.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985; B.A., Michigan State University.
J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985; B.Ed., Avery Hill College, London, U.K.
B.A., English, Cornell University, 1976; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1986.
1. 709 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. at 1181.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1180.
**
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quently convicted in district court under the federal false statement
statute.

6

On appeal, the defendants raised three issues: 1) that the matter was
not within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States because vouchers were neither submitted to nor paid by a federal
agency; 7 2) that the district court gave an improper jury instruction as to

the mens rea element of their crime;8 and 3) that Petullo was entitled to a
new trial because his partner offered a "mutually antagonistic defense." 9
All three arguments failed. This section will focus solely on the first of
these arguments.
In an opinion written by Judge Cudahy, the court relied on a line of
cases which support imposing federal jurisdiction because of the federal
government's strong interest in assuring that its funds are properly
0 Because this interest is so pervasive, the court found it unnecesspent. 1
sary to consider whether the federal funds had actually been paid out. So
long as the funds were earmarked for a specific program, federal jurisdiction would lie when the defendant applied for those funds through misrepresentations.I' The court found the existence, as opposed to the
exercise, of federal supervisory authority to be the crucial factor. Accordingly, the mere authorization of federal funds, such as a "line of
2
credit," triggers potential federal jurisdiction.'
This conclusion follows prior case law extending federal jurisdiction
when false statements are made to obtain federal funds1 3 whether the
party paying the money was itself entitled to the federal funds, or
whether it acted as a conduit for those funds. 14 Since the justification in
those cases stems from the concern that federal money should not be
misused, the Petullo court found no difference between the defendant's
actual receipt of the federal funds, and the possibility of receiving those
6.

Whomever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the

United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
7. Petullo, 709 F.2d at 1180.
8. Id. at 1181.
9. Id.
10. See United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352, 1357 (1 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Baker, 626
F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 983 (1979).
11. Petullo, 709 F.2d at 1180.
12. Id. at 1181. See United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1983).
14. United States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1981).
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funds through a "line of credit."' 15
While the Petullo court limited its holding only to situations where
federal disaster relief funds are involved, the holding is consistent with
other cases involving the acquisition of federal money by misrepresentation. 16 Since the narrow holding was a logical extension of prior case
law, the decision was proper.
The court affirmed another conviction for embezzling public funds' 7
in United States v. Bailey.18 As in Petullo, the rationale for the Bailey
decision was federal dominion and control over the funds.
Bailey's conviction arose out of three separate real estate transactions during which he acted as an escrow agent and private closing attorney for a Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) loan. 19 In each of the
transactions, Bailey received specific instructions to return money from
the transaction to FmHA. However, in each transaction, he failed to
20
return the balance due to FmHA.
On appeal, Bailey contended that his convictions should be reversed
2
because the money involved was not the federal government's property. '
He claimed that once the checks issued by FmHA were endorsed over by
the borrower, the money became the borrower's property. 22 The court
23
rejected Bailey's contentions and relied on United States v. McIntosh.
The court concluded that so long as the government has supervision and
control over the property, title is not necessary to establish federal liability.2 4 Accordingly, since Bailey was required to account for the balance
of the FmHA loan, the government maintained sufficient control to trigger federal jurisdiction.
In United States v. Harris,25 the court held that federal jurisdiction
15. Petullo, 709 F.2d at 1181.
16. See supra notes 10 and 12-14.
17. Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any record, voucher, money or
thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or...
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his own use
or gain, knowing it to be embezzled stolen, purloined or convertedShall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both ...
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
18. 734 F.2d 296 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 327 (1984).
19. 734 F.2d at 298.
20. Id. at 299.
21. Id. at 300.
22. Id.
23. 655 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
24. Bailey, 734 F.2d at 300-301.
25. 729 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1984).
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324

was triggered by the defendant's theft of property, even if there was no
conclusive evidence that the materials stolen were purchased with federal
funds.
The defendants, Harris and Gray, were assigned to lay tile in a pub26
lic housing complex, owned by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).
The materials for the job were financed out of a grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which paid sixty percent of CHA's operating expenses. 27 Based on a tip that the defendants
were stealing government property, an undercover agent arranged to
have Harris tile the kitchen and bathroom of a home where the agent
supposedly lived. The next day, the materials for the job were delivered.
The agent found six boxes of tile in the house, one of which was open.
The court noted that one box of tiles costs $17.28. Consequently, if all
six boxes were full, the total value of them would be $103.68. Only four
of the boxes were used, however; the two remaining boxes were given to
the undercover agent. 28 Therefore, the issue became one of supplying
provisions of the appellate caseload statute. 29
Harris and Gray were each charged with embezzling tile belonging
to HUD. On appeal, the court considered the applicability of the statute
to the defendants, since they were employees of a state agency which
received 60% of its operating funds from a federal agency, and had em30
bezzled items which were paid for 100% by HUD.
The court decided that the defendants, while not technically agents
of HUD, were doing its work, and therefore the case was analogous to
United States v. Coleman.3 1 The Coleman court held that misapplication
of services generated from federal funds was indistinguishable from misapplication of the funds themselves. Therefore, Coleman was guilty of
26.
27.
28.
29.

Harris, 729 F.2d at 444.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 444. See also supra note 29.
Whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of or connected in any capacity

with. . . . [HUD] . . . embezzles . . . things of value belonging to such institution . . .

shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but if
the amount or value embezzled. . . does not exceed $100, he shall be fined out more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 657 (1982).
30. Id. at 445.
31. 590 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). Coleman was found liable
under 18 U.S.C. § 665, which punished individuals who embezzled money from an agency receiving
financial assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Coleman,
590 F.2d at 229. Coleman was Assistant Director to the General Services Department of the City of
Gary, Indiana. Id. at 230. In that capacity, Coleman supervised Gary Manpower, a CETA funded
department. Coleman's liability was derived from his direction to a Manpower crew to construct
political signs and perform tasks for Coleman's construction business. Id.

CRIMINAL LAW

embezzling public funds. 32 Similarly, the Harris court found a strong
federal interest in deterring the embezzlement of federal property (tiles).
Consequently, it had no difficulty asserting federal liability "when the
embezzler happens to be an employee not of the federal agency that owns
the property but of a contractor who has custody of it. ' ' 3 3 The court was
not impressed with the burden which employees must face to determine
the financial relationships between their employer and the federal agency
which funds their employer.
The most interesting aspect of the case was the court's analysis that
the tiles were " 'things of value belonging to' HUD. ' ' 34 The defendants
argued that since the CHA used federal money to purchase the tiles, the
titles became tangible property of the CHA, as opposed to HUD. Therefore, the defendants claimed they were not liable under the federal statutes. Concluding otherwise, the court held that there is no difference
between converting money from a HUD account and converting property which was purchased with HUD money. Any other interpretation
would "encourage the aspiring embezzler to wait till the grant money
was expended" to escape federal liability. 35 The court noted that it
would have reached a different conclusion had the money not been traceable to a particular piece of property, i.e. the tiles. 36 However, because
the federal funds used to purchase the tiles were maintained in a separate
account, the Harris court was able to trace the funds.
B.

"Possession" Construed

In United States v. Taylor,37 the court held that exclusive ownership
of a townhouse constituted constructive ownership of all the contents
found on the premisis. Therefore, the defendant was guilty of "knowingly possessing" firearms found on the premisis.
Pursuant to a search warrant, Taylor's house was searched on January 12, 1982, just after Taylor had allegedly returned from an out of state
trip. The purpose of the search was to locate cocaine and proof of residency. 38 During the search, the police discovered an unregistered auto32. Id. at 231. See also Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959).
33. Coleman, 590 F.2d at 445.
34. Id. at 446.
35. Id. ". . . federal funds commingled with with nonfederal funds [do] not lose their federal
character simply because the account was administered by a nonfederal agency . . . evidence of
federal control and monitoring of those funds [is] sufficient to support convictions [under a federal
statute]." United States v. Gibbs, 704 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1983).
36. Harris, 729 F.2d at 447.
37. 728 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1984).
38. Taylor, 728 F.2d at 865.
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matic submachine gun with a fully loaded clip, and a silencer which fit
over the barrel of the gun. 39 Taylor was immediately arrested. He denied possession of the gun and silencer and claimed that they belonged to
4°
a friend who was staying over at his residence while Taylor was away.
A grand jury charged Taylor with possession of an unregistered
machine gun and an unregistered silencer in violation of the National
Firearms Act. 4 1 Despite Taylor's claim that the gun, silencer, and other
confiscated contraband belonged to a friend whom Taylor had not seen,
the jury convicted him. 42 This discussion focuses on Taylor's second
point of appeal: that the evidence presented by the government was insufficient to prove that he "knowingly possessed" the machine gun and
43
silencer.
Taylor claimed that mere ownership of the house, standing alone,
did not conclusively prove that he possessed all the contents in the
house. 44 To support his contentions, he relied on dicta contained in
United States v. Craven.45 In Craven, the Sixth Circuit noted that "possession of a residence is insufficient to establish possession of all the contents of the house."' 46 The Taylor court, however, based its opinion on
the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict Taylor, as opposed to the
legal definition of possession under the National Firearms Act. 47 Consequently, the Craven dicta was inapplicable insofar as it defined actual
possession. However, the court relied on Craven to establish the necessary elements of constructive possession, which exists when one has dominion and control over an entity. 48 The Taylor court reasoned that
since Taylor owned the townhouse and exercised complete dominion and
control over it, he had constructive possession of the gun and silencer
39. Id. at 866, n.2.
40. Id. at 866-67.
41. "It shall be unlawful for any person... to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him
in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or . . . to receive or possess a firearm made in violation
26 U.S.C.
of this chapter; or. . .to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him.
§ 5861(b)-(d) (1982).
42. Id. at 867.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 868.
45. 478 F.2d 1329 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
46. Id. at 1333.
47. Taylor, 728 F.2d at 868.
48. Craven, 478 F.2d at 1333. Accord United States v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177 (1983); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kalama, 549
F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977); United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d
103, 107 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Daniels, 527 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d 817, 823 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975); United States
v. Black, 472 F.2d 130, 131 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nora., Leach v. United States, 411 U.S.
969 (1973).
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which were found on the premises. Overall, the opinion is consistent
constructive possession to hold
with other cases which have relied on
49
defendants guilty on similar charges.
The court considered another appeal for possession of a firearm in
United States v. Martin.50 In Martin, the Seventh Circuit considered
whether the defendant's conviction for receipt of a firearm, 51 or for pos53
52
session of a firearm should stand.

Martin was convicted at trial after he was stopped by police while
carrying a .22 caliber rifle. The rifle was manufactured for an auto supply company, but somehow made its way to Martin's sister's home,
Marwhere he acquired it on the day he was arrested. A jury convicted
54
tin for possession and receipt of an unregistered firearm.
On appeal, Martin convinced the court that the legislative history
indicated that Congress did not intend to punish cumulatively both the
receipt and possession of firearms.5 5 The court held that possession is not

the lesser included offense of receipt, but actually part of the same crime.
Consequently "one cannot possess a firearm without receiving it. And
'5'
when received, a firearm is necessarily possessed.

6

Accordingly, the court held that both convictions could not stand,
and the case was remanded to vacate one of the convictions.
C. Intent Versus Preparationto Commit a Crime
In United States v. Schramm, 57 the court of appeals gave new meaning to the phrase "intent to commit a robbery." The court held that
Schramm committed sufficient preparatory steps and a crime would have
concurring); United
49. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
States v. Gates, 491 F.2d 720, 721 (7th Cir. 1974).
50. 732 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. "Any person who... has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State...
of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce . . . any firearm shall be

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both." 18 U.S.C. App.
§ 1202 (1984).
who has been convicted in any court of a crime
52. "It shall be unlawful for any person ..
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(i) (1982).
53. See also Ball v. United States, 734 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 82
(1984).
54. Martin, 732 F.2d at 592.
55. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 635 F.2d 232, 233 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Conn, 716 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Girst, 645 F.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1979); United States v. Larson, 625 F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Martin, 732 F.2d at 592.
57. 715 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1717 (1984).
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occurred, but for the intervention of and Schramm's arrest by the FBI. 58
The decision is internally inconsistent and unsupported by the authority
upon which it relies.
While Dan Schramm was on parole, he allegedly planned to rob a
bank on the Northeast side of Milwaukee with Recardo Reys. 59 At 1:30
p.m. on the day of the planned robbery, Schramm and Reys met with an
accomplice who was to obtain a hotel room which would serve as a hid60
ing place after the robbery. The robbery was scheduled for 5:00 p.m.
Meanwhile, Schramm was scheduled to meet his parole officer downtown. Afterwards, he planned to go to the south side of town to obtain
walkie-talkies for the robbery, then return downtown to commit the robbery. 6 1 The robbery never occurred, however, because Schramm was
arrested during the meeting with his parole officer. He was subsequently
convicted for attempted bank robbery.
Schramm denied planning a robbery and claimed that his preparatory activities were actually part of a scheme designed to entice Reys into
a sexual liason at the hotel room.62 The jury disbelieved his story and the
court of appeals held that the robbery was thwarted only by Schramm's
63
timely arrest.
The court relied on its analysis from Rumfelt v. United States 64 to
hold Schramm liable for attempted robbery. 65 The Rumfelt court held
that "preparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable
fragment of the crime committed, [the crime] must be in such progress
that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of the attempter ... 66
In Rumfelt, 67 and in United States v. Baker,68 the opinions relied on
in Schramm, the defendant's criminal acts had progressed appreciably
further than in the instant case. 69 Schramm, however, failed to commit
58. Schramm, 715 F.2d at 1255.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1256 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1254.
63. Id. at 1253.
64. 445 F.2d 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971).
65. Rumfelt held that the elements necessary to establish an attempt to commit a crime were
1) the intent to commit the crime; 2) execution of some overt act in pursuance of the intention; and,
3) failure to consummate the crime. 445 F.2d at 136.
66. Id. (emphasis added), citing People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317, 321 (1953).
67. 445 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971).
68. 129 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
69. In Baker, the defendant entered a bank, wrote out a robbery demand note, discarded the
note, left the bank to obtain a larger sack for the robbery proceeds, and then continued on to another
bank which he ultimately robbed. He was prosecuted for the attempted robbery of the second bank.
Baker, Id. at 686-87. In Rumfelt, the masked defendant threatened a witness with a gun in front of
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an appreciable fragment of the crime with which he was charged. In
fact, he merely began preparations to commit the crime. He had yet to
complete his preparations (as evidenced by his failure to procure the
walkie talkies); nor was his crime about to occur at the time he was arrested. Therefore, the opinion is inconsistent with the cases which it relies on. Moreover, in United States v. Green,70 another Seventh Circuit
case, the court found that a criminal attempt did not exist until the criminal completed all the elements of the offense which he could ever commit
71
and which were within his control.

Commentators have claimed that the distinction between preparing
and attempting to commit a crime is nebulous. 72 However, neither those
commentators, nor case law, 73 support the majority's conclusion in the
instant case. Even the concurring opinion agrees that an appreciable
fragment of the crime was not committed. 74 Rather, the concurring
opinion felt Schramm's arrest was justified because some of his preparatory steps could have caused public safety concerns. 75 Overall, United
States v. Schramm 76 is a poorly reasoned and wrongly decided case.
III.

A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Airport Encounter Cases

During the 1983-84 term, the court considered four cases 77 relating
to whether the encounter between an individual and police officers or
federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents (DEA) at O'Hare Inthe bank which the defendant intended to rob, then changed his mind and retreated without commitat 135.
ting the robbery. Rumfelt, 445 F.2d
70. 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
71. Id. at 1072.
72. "[T]he corpus delicti of attempted robbery does not happen until the intended victim's
vicinity is reached or he is subjected to some physical contact or put in fear." Stahorn, Preparation
for Crime as a Criminal Attempt, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 13 (1939). "ITlhe defendant's conduct
must pass that point where most men. . . would think better of their conduct and desist." Skilton,
The Requisite Act in Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PiTr. L. REV. 308, 309-10 (1937).
73. In United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1114 (1975), the court held that "the defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a
substantial step toward commission of the crime." Id. at 376. In Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d
687, 690-91 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1940), where the court noted
that "an attempt is an endeavor to do an act carried beyond mere preparation, but falling short of
execution, . . . [t]he direct movement towards the commission of the crime after preparations have
been made." 113 F.2d at 690. See also People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927).
74. Schramm, 715 F.2d at 1256 (Cudahy, J.,concurring).
75. Id. at 1253.
76. Schramm, 715 F.2d at 1253.
77. United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1291 (1984);
United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 131
(1984); United States v. Morgan, 725 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d
520 (7th Cir. 1984).

330

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

ternational Airport constituted a seizure within the ambit of the fourth
amendment. 78 Each case involved Chicago police officers or DEA
agents, assigned to narcotics duty at O'Hare, who monitored passengers
' 79
arriving from flights originating in narcotics "source cities."
As passengers disembarked, police authorities surveyed the passengers for suspicious persons. 80 In each case the defendants 8' attracted the
attention of the authorities who then proceeded to follow them through
the airport. At a certain point, the authorities approached the defend82
ants and identified themselves as police or DEA agents. In two cases
the authorities asked the defendant to speak with them. In the third
case, 8 3 the agent asked the defendant and his companion if the agent
could question them. In the fourth case, 84 the agents simply asked the
two defendants for identification. In each instance, the defendants
agreed to the requests and spoke with the agents. Subsequently, the
agents asked the defendants if they would consent to a search of their
luggage. All consented. 85 In three of the cases, United States v.
88
Cordell,86 United States v. Morgan,87 and United States v. Notorianni,
agents found narcotics in the defendant's luggage. In the fourth case,
United States v. $84,000 US. Currency,8 9 agents discovered large quantities of money upon conducting a pat-down search of the two defendants.
78. The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
79. "Source cities" are cities which serve as distribution points for large quantities of drugs to
other points in the United States. See United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1092
n.l (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 131 (1984).
80. See Id. n.2 and accompanying text. The Drug Enforcement Agency has developed a "drug
courier's profile" listing common characteristics of drug couriers. Some characteristics are an anxious manner, causal dress, suspicious conduct, and arriving from Florida fair-skinned rather than
tanned. The opinion in $84,000 US. Currency indicates that DEA agents followed the defendants
because they displayed characteristics included in the DEA courier profile. It is likely that authorities also used the DEA courier profile in deciding to follow the defendants in the other three cases.
However, the court's opinions do not explicitly state this.
81. One case, United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983) cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 131 (1984), was an action brought by the United States government involving a
civil forfeiture proceeding against money in possession of Donald Holmes and Max Reyes.
Although Holmes and Reyes were claimants in the civil case, they will be included in the general
designation of "defendants" in the course of this discussion.
82. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1284; Morgan 725 F.2d at 57.
83. Notorianni, 729 F.2d at 521.
84. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1093.
85. Although there was conflicting testimony in some cases at the district court level, the appellate court in those instances deferred to the district courts which believed the police officers' or DEA
agents' testimony rather than the defendants'. See Morgan, 725 F.2d at 58 and $84,000 US. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1096. Furthermore, each case involved a bench trial.
86. 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 704 S.Ct. 1291 (1984).
87. 725 F.2d 56.
88. 729 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1984).
89. 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 131 (1984).
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After discovering the money or drugs, the agents arrested the defendants.
The defendants in Cordell, Morgan and Notorianni were convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 90 The defendants' $84,000
in $84,000 U.S. Currency was seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 9 1
The common question presented in each case concerned whether the
initial consensual encounter between the authorities and the defendants
developed into an illegal detention or "seizure" under the fourth amendment so that any evidence obtained in the subsequent searches was
tainted and inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree. ''9 2 The court
approached each of the cases with the assumption made explicit by the
93
Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer.
Law enforcement officers do not violate the fourth amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in
a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such
evidence in
94
questions.

However, the court also applied tests to determine if the airport encounters rose to the level of a seizure 95 and, if a seizure had occurred,
97
96
whether it was justified under the fourth amendment.

90. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides that money that is intended for use in a drug transaction is
subject to forfeiture.
92. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963).
93. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
94. Id. at 497 (1983). See also infra notes 82 and 83.
95. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
96. Citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975), the Seventh Circuit
stated that the test was "whether the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity-the standard of justification for investigatory steps." 723 F.2d at 1285.
97. The issues of whether an encounter between air travelers and authorities constitutes a
seizure and whether such a seizure is justified have been addressed in three Supreme Court cases:
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 544 (1980), and United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In these cases, government agents approached defendants who
displayed characteristics included in the DEA drug courier profile. With the defendants' alleged
consent, the agents searched the defendants' luggage or person, found narcotics and arrested the
defendants.
In a plurality opinion in Mendenhall, two justices concluded that the defendant had not been
seized because she had "no objective reason to believe that she was not free to leave." Mendenhall at
555. Three other justices concluded that although the defendant may have been seized, the seizure
was lawful because the agents had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity based
on her behavior in the terminal. Id. at 564, and 565. The dissent, however, disagreed, and characterized the defendant's behavior as consistent with "the kind of behavior that could reasonably be
expected of anyone changing planes in an airport terminal." Id. at 576.
In Reid the Court held that a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior does not automatically
arise because an individual fits within the DEA courier profile. Finally, in Royer, a plurality of four
justices, stated that while authorities initially had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity upon
which to detain the defendant, when the detention later rose to the level of an arrest unsupported by
probable cause, the defendant's subsequent consent to a luggage search was tainted and the evidence
seized had to be suppressed. Royer at 502-3, 507. In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan con-
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The seventh circuit's test for determining whether an individual has
been seized was first articulated in United States v. Black. 98 In Black, the
court stated that "[a]s long as a person remains at liberty to disregard a
police officer's request for information, no constitutional interest is implicated." 99 This test was based on the plurality opinion in United States v.
Mendenhall.100 In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart held that "a person has
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person could have believed that he was not free to leave." 10 1
Recognizing that determination of whether an individual has been
seized involves a highly factual analysis, the Black court took two additional steps. First, it outlined three factors to be considered in determining whether a seizure in the context of an airport surveillance had
occurred: the conduct of the police, the characteristics of the individual
citizen, and the physical surroundings of the encounter.10 2 Second, it
held that because the district judge has "the opportunity to observe the
testimony and demeanor of the witnesses"'' 0 3 the court should defer to
the district court's decision as to whether a seizure had occurred by employing only a "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
The differences among the four cases turn on the facts and the
court's interpretation of the facts. In addition, dissenting opinions in two
cases 1°4 and a reluctant concurrence in a third case 05 indicate dissatisfaction within the court regarding the development and application of
the law at issue.
In the first case, United States v. Cordell,10 6 the court held that the
initial encounter between police officers and the defendant at O'Hare
cluded that the defendant was seized once the DEA agent identified himself and asked for Royer's

ticket and identification. He further concluded that the facts of the situation did not provide the
authorities with a basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
98. 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
99. Id. at 134. But see Id. at 138 (J. Swygert dissenting).
100. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
101. Id. at 554. An objective reasonable person test has since been adopted in a civil suit by a
majority of the Supreme Court to determine whether or not an individual has been seized or is in
custody. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984). An
objective reasonable person test has also been applied in the criminal context. See Berkemer v.
McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984). See also, Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (1984).
102. The three factors are: the conduct of the police, the characteristics of the individual citizen,
and the physical surroundings of the encounter. 675 F.2d at 134.
103. Id. at 134. In his dissent, Judge Swygert believed that the use of the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review was incorrect because the matter in dispute was one of law rather than fact. He
observed that the court was not disputing the district court factual findings, but whether those facts
constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 138.
104. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1102, and Notorianni, 729 F.2d at 523.
105. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1286.
106. 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983).
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initial encounter between police officers and the defendant at O'Hare
Airport developed into a detention, i.e. a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. However, the court determined that the detention was justified under the fourth amendment because the police had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time the encounter became a detention. 107
In Cordell,two Chicago police officers, assigned to narcotics duty at
O'Hare, observed Cordell leave the arrival area at a fast pace. 10 8 The
officers followed him out of the airport to a well-lit public area. They
approached Cordell, identified themselves, and asked Cordell if he would
speak to them. Cordell agreed.' 0 9 The officers asked him for identification. Cordell gave one officer his driver's license and his airline ticket.
The officers noted that Cordell's ticket had been paid for in cash and
issued under a different name. During this period, Cordell appeared very
nervous. 10 The officer to whom he had initially given his ticket handed
it to the second officer and informed him that they were conducting a
narcotics investigation. He asked Cordell if he was carrying narcotics.
When Cordell answered no, the officer asked if he could look in Cordell's
travel bag. Cordell agreed."' Cordell further consented to the officer's
request to open an envelope he found inside the travel bag. The officer
discovered a plastic bag containing white powder and arrested
Cordell. 112
The court held that Cordell was detained once the officer to whom
Cordell had given his ticket and driver's license handed them over to the
second officer. However, the court found that this detention did not exceed the bounds of an investigatory stop.' ' 3 Thus in determining
whether the detention violated Cordell's constitutional rights, the court
considered whether the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal activity which would justify an investigatory stop.' '4 The court
concluded that the officers did have a reasonable suspicion at the time the
encounter turned into a seizure." 15 At that point, the officer knew that
Cordell had arrived from Miami, a source city; the names on his ticket
and driver's license were different; Cordell had paid for his ticket in cash;
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id., at 1285, citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1284.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285, citing Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 501 (1983).
Id. at 1285, citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882.
Id. at 1285.
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Cordell appeared quite nervous and became more so as the officers continued to question him. The court held that the "officers clearly were
'entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience'.., and to susi 6
pect Cordell of a violation of the narcotics laws.""
Although Judge Swygert concurred with the opinion, he did so reluctantly as he felt "constrained by the principle of stare decisis to vote
for affirmance."' 1 7 Citing Mendenhall, he observed that an encounter
with the police rises to the level of a seizure when, if in view of all the
circumstances, a "reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave."' 1 8 Judge Swygert believed that as a factual matter people
do not feel free to leave when they are stopped by officers who identify
themselves as narcotics investigators." 19 However, he acknowledged that
cases such as Mendenhall and Royer demonstrate that "whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave is a technical legal construct
rather than a simple factual inquiry"' 20 and that situations involving re2
quests for questioning do not rise to the level of a seizure.' '
Judge Swygert also took issue with the majority's approval of the
officer's interpretation of the facts of the situation in light of their experience as a basis for an articulable suspicion. Swygert observed that, "[t]he
officer's intuition based on experience does not constitute an independent
datum."' 22 However, once again deferring to precedent, he acknowledged that the facts of the instant case, although weak, were similar to
those in Royer v. Florida, 23 where the Supreme Court found adequate
grounds for temporarily detaining an individual 124 in order to verify or
116. Id. at 1285, citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
117. Id. at 1286.
118. Id.
119. Judge Swygert here takes a position similar to Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in
Royer.
120. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1286.
121. In a plurality opinion in Mendenhall, Justice Stewart said that "[t]he respondent was not
seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them
her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions." 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980). In Royer,
a majority of the court made clear that "law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if
he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen,
or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. 460
U.S. at 497.
122. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1287.
123. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
124. In Royer, the court ultimately found that the defendant had been unlawfully arrested prior
to consenting to a search. However, in dicta, the Court noted that prior to the time the encounter
developed into an arrest, the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, sufficient to support a temporary detention. The court observed that the officers discovered Royer was
using an assumed name, had paid cash for a one-way ticket, had put a different name on his luggage
tickets, and appeared nervous. Id. at 501.
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dispel their suspicions.
Finally, after taking issue with the court's conclusion that Cordell's
1 25
consent was in fact true consent, but again deferring to precedent,
Swygert concluded with a strong warning. He warned that the practice
of stopping people for questioning when
[flew people will assert their rights, even if known in the face of police
authority. .

.

. [This] erodes the principle of freedom from official in-

terference guaranteed by the fourth amendment, and invites the use of
principles of selection abhorrent to the
arbitrary or discriminatory
1 26
fourth amendment.

In contrast to Cordell, the court in United States v. $84,000 U.S.
Currency, 27 found that no seizure had occurred from the time Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents at O'Hare Airport approached
and questioned the appellants up until the time appellants consented to a
search of their luggage.
Like the police officers in Cordell, the DEA agents were assigned to
monitor passengers arriving on flights from cities considered to be
sources for drugs. Upon determining that defendants Holmes and Reyes
fit the DEA "drug carrier profile,"' 28 the agents followed the appellants
from the time they disembarked from their first flight until they checked
in at a different gate approximately fifty minutes later for another flight.
After the last boarding call, the agents approached the two appellants
and asked them for identification. They each produced a driver's license
and airline ticket. The names on the tickets matched the names on the
licenses. However, the agents retained the tickets. One agent asked
Holmes and Reyes if they had luggage. They responded affirmatively.
The agents observed that Reyes' ticket had no baggage stub. They also
observed that Holmes and Reyes were nervous. 29 The agents asked
Holmes and Reyes if they would consent to a search of their luggage and
30
informed them of their right to refuse. Holmes and Reyes consented.
After one of the agents located the luggage, the two agents and the two
appellants went downstairs to a non-public area in order to conduct a
125. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58. (Whether respondent's consent to accompany agents
was voluntary is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances.)
126. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1288.
127. 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983). In addition to claiming that the evidence was inadmissible
as "fruit of the poisonous tree" the claimants/appellants contended that the DEA agent's pat-down
search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the money discovered was thus
inadmissible. The appellate court affirmed the district court's rejection of this argument on the
grounds that it was a proper protective search. Id. at 1098 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
128. See supra note 80.
129. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1092.
130. Id.

336
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search. There, one of the agents observed bulges in Reyes' pant legs near
the tops of his boots. The agent proceeded "for [his] own safety" to perform a pat-down search"' of Reyes. He also directed Reyes to remove
his boots, whereupon large quantities of money came spilling out. Upon
searching Holmes, the agent found more money. Holmes and Reyes
were then arrested.
In reviewing the district court's application of Mendenhall's "reasonable person" test, 132 the appellate court employed a clearly erroneous
standard of review. The court would accord deference to the lower
1 33
court's findings of fact unless they were unsupported by the record.
The court examined the factors articulated in Black1 34 in determining
whether a "reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." 1 3 5 The court upheld the district court's determination that no
seizure had occurred in the concourse area and that the defendants "were
free to walk away at that time."'' 36 The court further upheld the district
court's finding that the appellants had voluntarily consented to the luggage search before going downstairs and had voluntarily accompanied
the agents downstairs. 137 After considering other issues,' 3 8 the court af39
firmed the district court's forfeiture order.
Unlike Cordell where he reluctantly concurred, Judge Swygert dissented. He reiterated his position in Black that the clearly erroneous
standard of review is inappropriate. Judge Swygert maintained that the
question before the court was a question of law-whether the facts con-

131. See supra note 127.
132. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 102.
135. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1096. The district courts found that 1) the officers did
not restrain the appellants physically or by force of authority; 2) there was no evidence to suggest the
appellants required special protection from police contacts; 3) there was nothing coercive in the
physical setting of the initial encounter at the concourse. Id. at 1095-96.
136. Id. at 1097.
137. The dissent believed this finding to be clearly erroneous. According to the facts recited by
the majority, when Reyes expressed hesitation about consenting to a search of the luggage, the DEA
agents told Holmes and Reyes that they were not interested in small quantities of drugs. The agents
told them that if they found such small quantities, they would take them and let Holmes and Reyes
go. The majority found that Holmes and Reyes "voluntarily accompanied the officers in a spirit of
apparent cooperation." Id. at 1096. By contrast, the dissent found that consent was not voluntarily
given and the "petitioners could reasonably conclude that their freedom to leave was contingent
upon their consent to the search." Id. at 1103. In note 8, the majority characterises Swygert's
finding as "mere speculation, at best," claiming that Swygert "once again.., has chosen to credit"
the defendant's testimony.
138. The court held that the pat-down search was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968). It also held that statements Holmes and Reyes made to one of the agents were admissible at
the forfeiture proceedings. Finally the court found that the $84,000 seized was properly seized pursuant to the forfeiture statute.
139. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1102.
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stitute a fourth amendment seizure-and therefore, deference is
inappropriate. 140
In reviewing the record, Judge Swygert criticized the district court's
findings. Applying Justice Stewart's "reasonable person" test, he concluded that the agents had actually seized the appellants in the concourse
area, prior to obtaining their consent to search their luggage. In support
of his conclusion, Justice Swygert first observed that even though the
defendants' licenses and tickets were in order, the agents took and retained the documents. The agents returned Reyes' ticket only to permit
him to ask the airline why no baggage stubs were attached. 141 Second, in
further disagreement with both the appellate and district courts, Judge
Swygert concluded that the defendants did not voluntarily consent to the
search of their luggage. 142 Finally Judge Swygert concluded that given
that Holmes and Reyes were seized, the seizure was nonetheless unlawful
because the DEA agents lacked "knowledge of specific and articulable
' 43
facts to justify the seizure."'
In United States v. Morgan, 144 the court never decided whether the
defendant had been seized. Morgan arrived at O'Hare Airport. She and
a traveling companion, Steuwe, attracted DEA agents' attention. The
agents followed them. After Morgan and Steuwe separated, two agents
approached Steuwe and talked with him. He told them he was traveling
alone. With Steuwe's consent, the agents searched a handbag he was
140. Id. at 1103. In a concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy also stated that the question of
whether an individual has been seized is a matter of law and that the "clearly erroneous" standard is
therefore inapplicable. Id. at 1102. However Judge Cudahy agreed with the majority's result and
found that "as a matter of fact and law ... there was no seizure." Id. In response, the majority
observed that Judge Cudahy previously accepted the "clearly erroneous" standard, but was "now
choos[ing] to disregard the accepted law of this circuit." The majority also noted that Judge Swygert
was disregarding the established precedent and refusing to defer to the district court findings. Id. at
1095 n.6.
141. Judge Swygert observed that the defendants could reasonably conclude that they were not
free to leave because they had been deprived of their tickets and they perceived they could move only
with permission. Id. at 1102-3. Inexplicably, neither the majority nor the dissent attempted any
explicit comparison with Cordell, which was decided the same day, on the issue of the agents retaining the tickets.
142. See supra note 138.
143. Here again the majority and the dissent collided head-on in regard to the district court's
finding regarding this matter. Although not necessary to its legal conclusions, the majority strongly
defended the district court's finding that the facts gave rise to an articulable suspicion and chastised
the dissent for not giving due deference to the factual findings of the district court. See 717 F.2d
1096 n.7, 1103-04.
144. 726 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1984). The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute and appealed the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence. The
defendant contended that the cocaine had been seized pursuant to an unlawful seizure of her own
person. At the bench trial the district court believed the agents' testimony rather than Morgan's.
The facts that follow are based on the findings of the district court.
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Morgan and asked to speak to her. When she agreed, they asked her for
identification. She presented her own driver's license and airplane tickets
in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Steuwe. She appeared nervous.1 46 The
agents identified themselves as narcotics agents and asked if she would
consent to a search of her baggage. Morgan consented to a search. The
agents searched and found nothing. 147 During this time Morgan was
looking about for Steuwe, and one of the agents suggested she look
outside. Morgan did so and left her luggage with the agents. When she
returned the agents asked her if she would consent to a second search.
She did, and the agents found cocaine in the center of a sanitary napkin
48
box and arrested her.'

After finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to both
searches, the court raised the question of whether Morgan nonetheless
had been seized under the Mendenhall and Black standards. Specifically,
the court compared the facts of the Morgan case to Mendenhall' 49 and
Cordell.150 However, the court concluded that it did not have to decide
whether she was actually detained because during the course of the consensual conversation the agent had "enough reasonable, articulable suspicions to detain her for investigation."' 5' The court based this
conclusion on three facts. First, Morgan's ticket had Steuwe's name on
it. Second, Morgan said she was travelling with Steuwe and that one of
her pieces of luggage was his, whereas Steuwe said he was travelling
alone without luggage. Third, Morgan "appeared to be nervous and
frightened."

52

The court also rejected Morgan's contention that, after the agents
searched her luggage and found nothing, the subsequent questioning constituted an illegal detention. Rather, the judges agreed with the district
court which distinguished Royer and other cases.' 53 The judges appar146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 58.
149. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
150. 723 F.2d 1283. See supra notes 221-241 and accompanying text. The court found that the
circumstances in the instant case were less restrictive than Mendenhall, where Justice Stewart, joined
by Justice Rehnquist, found that no seizure had occurred. It also found the situation quite similar to
Cordell except for the fact that the agents did not retain Morgan's tickets during their initial encounter. In Cordell the fact that the agents retained Cordell's ticket transformed the encounter into a
seizure. See Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283.
151. Morgan, 725 F.2d at 60.
152. Id.
153. In Royer the defendant, without his consent, was taken to a small room to wait while detectives retrieved his bags. The Court found that "[a]s a practical matter, Royer was under arrest." Cf
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, (1983) and United States v. Moya, 704 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983) on remand 445 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ently found that Morgan was free to leave because the agents never
moved or took her luggage. In addition, the court reiterated that Morgan "consented to both searches in a public place 'on the spot.' ",154 A
unanimous court affirmed the lower court conviction.
55
Finally in United States v. Notorianni,1
the Seventh Circuit once
again considered whether a consensual encounter at O'Hare Airport escalated into an unlawful seizure and thereby vitiated the citizen's subsequent consent to the search of his luggage. The court took the
opportunity to reaffirm, although somewhat defensively, the objective
reasonable person test which it had borrowed from Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Mendenhall and articulated in Black. 156 The court emphasized that the issue was not whether Notorianni felt free to disregard
the DEA agent's questions, but whether the reasonable person would
have felt free to disregard the agent's questions. Although the court was
"troubled" that the district court did not make a specific finding of fact
that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt free
to disregard the agents, the court reviewed the record, applied the test
and concluded as a matter of law that the defendant had not been
57
seized.'
In Notorianni the defendant and his girlfriend were approached by
an agent. The agent identified himself and asked the couple's permission
to ask some questions. Notorianni agreed and the three moved to the
side of the concourse. The agent asked for identification. Notorianni
presented his ticket. The agent told him that he was conducting a narcotics investigation. He asked Notorianni if he could search his luggage,
informing him of his right to refuse. Notorianni consented; the agent
found cocaine in one of his suitcases and arrested Notorianni.
In concluding that Notorianni had not been seized, the court
observed:
We know from Royer and Black and a host of other airport-surveillance cases that merely accosting a person in an airport, identifying
yourself as a federal agent and asking that person whether he is willing
to answer questions do not create a setting in which the average person
does not feel free to thumb his nose at the agent. (Maybe this is a
wrong guess about what the
average person feels in this situation but it
is the law of this circuit). t58
154. In Royer the court observed that if Royer had consented to a search "on the spot" while in
a public area, the evidence would have been admissible. 460 U.S. at 505.
155. 729 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1983).
156. As a result of later Supreme Court cases, the objective reasonable person test is now clearly
the test to apply to determine when an individual has been seized. See note 101 supra.
157. Id. at 523.
158. Id. at 522.
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is the law of this circuit).' 58
In support of its conclusion the court found the fact that the agent told
Notorianni that he was conducting a narcotics investigation made the
circumstances less coercive.' 5 9 The court also found that the fact that a
total of four people were ultimately accosted by two agents made no difference 60 to the determination. Finally, the majority refused to attach
any significance to the fact that the agent questioning Notorianni did not
explicitly state that he was free to leave. Rather, the court found the
statement implicit in the agent's inquiry. The court observed that "the
interrogatory mode impl[ied] that the choice to cooperate was
Notorianni's."
Judge Cudahy in his dissent found unacceptable the majority's willingness to conclude as a matter of law that Notorianni was not seized.
He objected to the majority's willingness to overlook the absence of a
specific district court finding on Notorianni's freedom to leave. He reminded the court of its previous reliance on and deference to the district
court's findings of facts. 16 1 Judge Cudahy stated that "[t]he requirement
of unequivocal factual findings is . . .hardly excessive in light of the
almost unlimited combinations of factual circumstances which surround
1 62
a procedure obviously open to subtle and not so subtle abuse."'
B.

Warrantless Searches

In United States v. Griffin, 163 the Seventh Circuit held that an automobile inventory search which consisted of opening an unlocked storage
compartment in the interior of a car, removing an unsecured brown paper bag, removing from the bag a partially secured taped package, and
opening the unsecured end of the package did not constitute an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. The court reversed the
lower court's order which suppressed the introduction of the narcotic
substance into the criminal proceeding.
In Griffin, the Indiana state police stopped a motorist, Jerome Griffin, for a traffic violation. The police impounded the car upon discovering that neither the defendant, Jerome, nor his passenger Charles Griffin,
could lawfully drive the vehicle. '64 Later, in the presence of Jerome and
a towing service attendant, a state trooper began a routine inventory
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 522.
Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 523.
See, e.g., United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (1982).
Notorianni, 729 F.2d at 523.
729 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 117 (1984).
Jerome Griffin was unable to produce a driver's license. As for Griffin's passenger, police
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search of the automobile.' 65 The trooper opened the lid of the storage
compartment and found two loaded guns. 166 He also noticed a paper bag
underneath the guns. He smelled a strange odor eminating from the bag.
Upon opening the bag, he found a package wrapped in brown paper and
secured with tape. The trooper then placed the package back in the bag
and returned the bag and the guns to the storage compartment. 167 He
directed the towing service attendant to drive the automobile two miles
168
down the road to a state police gas station.
There, the trooper continued his inventory search. At that time, the
trooper decided to inventory the contents of the bag. The trooper removed the brown package from the bag and opened the untaped end. He
observed a clear plastic bag containing a yellow substance, later identified
as a controlled substance.

169

In reviewing the government's appeal of the trial court's order suppressing the evidence, the court agreed with the district court's finding
that the trooper lawfully impounded the automobile. 70 However, unlike
the district court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the trooper conducted a routine inventory search in accordance with state police standard operating procedures. 17 In addition, the court disagreed with the
district court's finding that the trooper should not have opened the
brown paper bag. 172 In reaching that conclusion, the court relied heavily
on two Supreme Court cases, South Dakota v. Opperman,173 and Illinois
v. Lafayette.

174

In Opperman, the Supreme Court upheld an automobile inventory
search in which police opened an unlocked glove compartment and
found a plastic bag containing marijuana. In Lafayette, the Supreme
Court upheld a stationhouse inventory search in which police searched
inside the arrestee's shoulder bag and found a cigarette case package containing amphetamines. The Lafayette court employed a balancing test in
determining that the search was reasonable. Specifically, it balanced the
arrested him after discovering that an outstanding bench warrant existed for his failure to appear in
court for an unrelated traffic violation. Id. at 477.
165. Id. at 478.
166. Id. at 479.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 805 grams of phencycledine, a controlled substance. Id.
170. Id. at 482. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
171. Griffin, 729 F.2d at 482-83, n.10. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364(1976).
172. The district court believed that the trooper simply should have inventoried the paper bag or
at most should have removed the package and inventoried that, but should not have opened it.
Griffin, 729 F.2d at 484.
173. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
174. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
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degree to which the inventory search promoted the government's interests, against the degree to which the search intruded upon the arrestee's
fourth amendment interests. The court found that the government's interests, first articulated in Opperman, in protecting the owner's property,
protecting the police from false claims and protecting the police or others
from danger, outweighed the intrusion on the arrestee's fourth amendment rights. 1

75

In Griffin, the Seventh Circuit applied the same balancing test to the
automobile inventory search. The Seventh Circuit held that in light of all
the circumstances, including the guns and the strange smelling bag, the
government's interests incident to the search outweighed the defendants'
privacy interest in the unsecured brown bag. The court further held that
the government's interests outweighed any expectations of privacy that
the defendants may have had in the partially taped, wrapped package
inside the brown bag. Here, the court relied particularly on the government's interest in protecting the police from danger. The court stated
that, "[t]he contents. . . could have ranged from worthless sand to valuable diamonds to dangerous instrumentalities of a crime, including addi' 76
tional weapons, contraband or explosives."'
Finally, relying on Lafayette, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
although the inventory search could have been conducted by less intrusive means,' 7" that did not render it unreasonable. Citing Lafayette, the
court stated that " 'our role is to assure against violations of the Constitution' not to 'write a manual on administering [the] routine, neutral pro' 78
cedure' of an automobile search."'

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Eschbach argued that the search
was unconstitutional because the government failed to demonstrate that
the search "was truly inventorial, and not investigative."' 179 In Judge
Eschbach's view, the government failed to demonstrate that the inventory search was conducted in "accordance with established inventory
procedures" required by Opperman. 80 Judge Eschbach noted that the
trooper did not comply with the Indiana State Police procedures which
reflected a policy of inventorying cars prior to towing them away.
Rather, the trooper first searched the car, observed the guns and brown
paper bag and then turned the car over to the towing service attendant.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 643-45.
Griffin, 729 F.2d at 486, citing Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644.
Griffin, 729 F.2d at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 488. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647 and Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372.
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Only later, did the trooper continue his search and decide to open what
he described as the "suspicious" 1 8 1 package. Because the trooper's ac-

tions did not conform to the established procedures, the judge concluded
that the inventory search was unconstitutional. Finally, Judge Eschbach
warned that the constitutional requirement that inventory searches be
carried out in accordance with standard procedures would be rendered
"meaningless" if such procedures allowed for the exercise of absolute dis18 2
cretion by the searching officer.
C.

Franks Hearing

In two related cases, United States v. McDonald8s3 and United
States v. Reed, i8 4 the court considered whether the defendants were entitled to a Franks8 5 hearing regarding the validity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant. In both McDonald and Reed the court held that
self-serving testimony was insufficient to rebut the presumption of the
validity of an affidavit. 18 6 Therefore, the court rejected the defendants'
claims that they were entitled to a Franks hearing in order to prove that
the affiant had included false statements intentionally or recklessly. The
court also directly criticized People v. Garcia,8 7 an Illinois appellate
case, upon which McDonald relied.
Both McDonald and Reed were arrested after police searched McDonald's apartment pursuant to a search warrant. At the time, Martha
Reed was living with McDonald in the apartment. The warrant provided for the search of James McDonald's apartment in order to seize
cocaine and proof of residency. The warrant was issued pursuant to an
affidavit sworn to by a police detective. The detective had obtained information, from an historically reliable informant, that McDonald had cocaine in his apartment.
On appeal, McDonald and Reed argued that the lower court erred
in denying them a Franks hearing pursuant to their motions to suppress
the seized evidence. McDonald argued that he was entitled to a Franks
181. Griffin, 729 F.2d at 488.
182. Id. at 489.
183. 723 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2360 (1984).
184. 726 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1984).
185. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In a Franks hearing a defendant is given the
opportunity to show that an affiant, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, included
false statements in the affidavit and that the finding of probable cause depended on those false statements. However, the defendant must first make a "substantial preliminary showing" of the above
before being granted an evidentiary hearing.
186. 723 F.2d at 1294, citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("[T]here is... a presumption of validity
with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant."); see also Reed, 726 F.2d at 342.
187. 109 Ill. App. 3d 142, 440 N.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040, 1433 (1983).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

hearing because he had made the necessary "substantial preliminary
showing" 18 8 that the affiant had intentionally or recklessly included false
statements in the affidavit. McDonald relied on his own trial testimony
and Garcia to support his argument.
At trial, McDonald had stated that he was not in his apartment at
the time identified by the informant. Although the trial court did not
believe him, McDonald attempted to bolster his appellate argument by
relying on Garcia. In Garcia, the Illinois Appellate court found that a
defendant satisfied the preliminary substantial showing when he submitted an affidavit claiming that the warrant was in error. The Illinois court
noted that requiring the defendant to do more would "plac[e] an insurmountable burden upon the defendant" and it would be "presuming,"
1 89
without any basis, "that a police officer was telling the truth."
In response, the Seventh Circuit pointedly observed that the Illinois
court overlook[ed] the Supreme Court's statement that "there is

. .

. a

presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting a search
warrant."'' 90 Therefore, the seventh circuit rejected the reasoning of Garcia and found that McDonald's "self-serving" testimony was insufficient
to rebut this presumption.' 9'
Reed, too, relied on similar testimony given by McDonald at her
trial. Likewise, the court found that she failed to make a "substantial
preliminary showing."' 9 2 In addition, the court rejected Reed's second
argument that the detective was reckless in not verifying the informant's
statements. Specifically, the court held that the detective was not required to verify statements that were "sufficiently descriptive, current,
' 93
and of apparent reliability."'
D. Plain View Exception to the Warrant Requirement
In United States v. McDonald,9 4 United States v. Reed, 195 and
United States v. Jefferson,' 9 6 the Seventh Circuit applied its plain view
exception test 197 to determine if evidence seized, but not named in a war188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra note 185.
McDonald, 723 F.2d at 1294 quoting Garcia, 109 Il1. App. 3d at 146-47, 440 N.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 1294 quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 1294.
Reed, 726 F.2d at 342.
Id.

194. 723 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2360 (1984). See also supra notes
183-191 and accompanying text.
195. 726 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1984). See supra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
196. 714 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1983).
197. The test, set forth in United States v. Schire, 586 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978), states that the
plain view exception to the warrant requirement applies if 1)the initial intrusion which afforded the
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rant, was nonetheless admissible at trial. In each case, the court elaborated on the requirement that the incriminating nature of the evidence be
immediately apparent.
In Jefferson, police suspected that a particular residence was the
center of an elaborate drug distribution operation. The warrant issued
authorized seizure of particular controlled substances and "records of
drug dealing activity and currency." 19 8 In addition to seizing drugs and
cash, the police seized five fur coats, 142 pieces of jewelry, and nine firearms. Much of this evidence was introduced at trial despite the defendant's prior objection. On appeal, the court held that the evidence was
admissible under the plain view doctrine.
While the court admitted that the furs, jewelry and guns could have
been used for solely personal or sporting purposes, it held that considering the nature of the operation contemplated by the warrant, the officers
could have "logically concluded that the furs and jewelry were fruits of
an illegal operation tantamount to cash receipts." 199 Moreover, the court
stated that "[w]here a logical nexus" exists between items seized but unnamed in the warrant, and items named in the warrant, "the unnamed
items are admissible. ' ' 2°° The court continued, stating that even if the
furs and jewelry were not actually received as currency, they could nonetheless be seized because the circumstances of the search "reasonably
alerted the officers to the possibility that the items were fruits of another
illegal activity. "201
Similarly, in McDonald and Reed the warrant provided for the
seizure of cocaine and proof of residency. 2°2 However, the police also
seized mail, credit cards, automobile insurance cards, drivers' licenses,
and loan papers all of which bore names and addresses other than McDonald's. They also seized a gold bar and gold coins. On appeal, McDonald challenged the seizure of the mail, credit cards, auto insurance
cards, driver's licenses, money orders and loan papers, contending that
20 3
the incriminating nature of the items was not immediately apparent.
In McDonald the court framed its analysis somewhat differently
from that in Jefferson. Specifically, the court adopted the Supreme
authorities the plain view was lawful; 2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and 3) the
incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent.
198. Jefferson, 714 F.2d at 694.
199. Id. at 695.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. McDonald, 723 F.2d at 1290.
203. Id. at 1295.
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Court's plurality interpretation of "immediately apparent ' ' 20 4 in Texas v.
Brown. 20 5 In Brown the Court found that the criterion of "immediately
apparent" is satisfied upon a showing that there is "probable cause to
associate the property with criminal activity. ' 20 6 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that "probable cause is a flexible, common sense
'207
standard.
Within this framework the Seventh Circuit determined that the
items seized satisfied the "immediately apparent" criterion. First the
court held that the mail was properly seized because by the time the
search was over, 20 8 the mail appeared to incriminate McDonald in a
crime involving the United States mails. Then, echoing Jefferson, the
court held that the other items also satisfied the "immediately apparent"
test on the grounds that "a well-trained law enforcement officer, operating under a search warrant, contemplating the uncovering of a criminal
cocaine scheme, would instinctively suspect these items to incriminate
McDonald in some type of illegal conduct associated with cocaine trans'20 9
actions or mail tampering.
As in McDonald, the court in Reed rejected Reed's claim that the
incriminating nature of the mail was not immediately apparent. Then, in
dicta, the court justified the seizure of the gold. Specifically, the court
relied directly on the rationale employed in Jefferson without reference to
the "probable cause" language of Texas. The court simply stated that,
"[p]olice suspecting a cocaine dealing operation reasonably could
surmise that the gold represented the proceeds of such an operation, or
' 21 0
that it was the fruit of another illegal activity.
IV.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Seventh Circuit did not, in any significant way, add to the body
of case law governing fifth amendment issues. As the cases which follow
illustrate, the court reaffirmed its position in earlier cases and confined its
analysis to existing case law. Little attempt was made to break new fifth
amendment ground in the Seventh and other circuits.
204. Id.
205. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
206. Id. at 741-42.
207. McDonald, 723 F.2d at 1295 citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
208. The Seventh Circuit has held that "immediately apparent" does not mean apparent at first
glance, but "apparent without other information than that which the officers properly possessed
before their search was over." McDonald, 723 F.2d at 1295, citing United States v. Thomas, 676
F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
209. McDonald, 723 F.2d at 1296.
210. Reed, 726 F.2d at 343-44.
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In United States ex rel Clauser v. McCevers2 11 the defendant alleged
that his fifth amendment right against double jeopardy had been violated.
Briefly, the defendant was indicted for the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. 21 2 The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a
judgment of acquittal. 21 3 During his trial, however, it became evident
that state law enforcement officers had misrepresented the evidence
before the grand jury. The trial judge characterized the officers' conduct
as "grossly negligent" 21 4 and concluded that the indictment was invalid.
Accordingly, the trial was terminated. 215 When the defendant was later
re-indicted, he moved to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. This
2 16
motion was denied.
The district court observed that if the first trial was terminated due
to a "manifest necessity" the fifth amendment's double jeopardy provision was not invoked, 2 17 and the court of appeals affirmed. 218 Whether a
trial was terminated due to "manifest necessity" involves a determination
of whether the trial judge exercised sound discretion in terminating the
first trial. 219 Since judges have broad discretion in this area, 220 the court
of appeals held that a decision to terminate a trial because an indictment
was based on perjured testimony satisfied the "manifest necessity" requirements. 2 2' Thus the subsequent trial did not invoke the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Recently, the "entrapment" and "outrageous governmental conduct" defenses have been resurrected. Very few litigants have prevailed
on the latter theory, however, because they have not been able to show
that the government's conduct was so outrageous that it shocked the
211. 731 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1984).
212. Id. at 424.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Clauser v. Shadid, 563 F. Supp. 392, 395 (C.D. Ill.
1983).
218. Fahner, at 425, citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (9 Wheat.) (1824); Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1973); and United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130
(1980). The court also observed that in cases where the trial was terminated without the defendant's
consent, the burden was on the government to show that it was due to a "manifest necessity" in
order to sustain a reindictment and retrial. Fahner, 731 F.2d at 426, citing United States v. Di
Francesco, 449 U.S. at 130.
219. Id. at 427.
220. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961); Illinois v. Somerville, supra note 218;
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 (1978) (holding that a trial court is not required to make
an express finding of "manifest necessity" in order to demonstrate that there was a sound exercise of
its discretion).
221. 731 F.2d 427-29. See Illinois v. Rivera, 72 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1038, 390 N.E.2d 1259, 1267
(1979); Illinois v. Wolfe, 114 11. App. 3d 841, 844-45, 449 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (1983).
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conscience. 222
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Thoma,223 was faced with
an entrapment and outrageous governmental conduct defense. The court
held that neither defense was available to the defendant. 224 Arguably,
however, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is not consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.
The defendant in Thoma argued on appeal that his alleged illegal
conduct was the direct result of the government's inducement. 225 The
court observed that this argument raised both the entrapment defense
and the defense of outrageous governmental conduct.
In Thoma, John Ruberti, a Postal Inspector, received information
that Thoma had been purchasing pedophilia material through the mail
and might be involved in its production. On November, 1981 Ruberti
contacted Thoma by mail and asked him to join an organization known
as Crusaders for Sexual Freedom (CSF). 226 Thoma ignored this letter.
Later in November, Roberti again communicated with Thoma,
sending him an eight page pamphlet containing, inter alia, various advertisements that dealt with "a wide variety of sexual tastes. ' 227 Again
Thoma did not respond. In December, Roberti sent Thoma a letter informing him that he had been sponsored for a free membership in CSF.
Thoma filled out the membership form and thereafter responded to the
advertisements in the pamphlet. Thoma also sold, through the mail,
228
video tapes of minors engaged in sexual conduct.
The court of appeals observed that the success of the entrapment
defense hinges on whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime or whether the government had induced an unpredisposed person
to engage in criminal activity. 229 The court held that there was not
enough evidence to establish entrapment as a matter of law because the
evidence presented was only sufficient to send the question of entrapment
230
to the fact finder.
Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his
222. This has been the burden of proof in "outrageous government conduct" defenses since 1973
(see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). The Supreme Court has been unwilling
to relax this standard even slightly.
223. 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984).
224. Id. at 1198-99.
225. Id. at 1196.
226. Id. at 1194.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1195.
229. Id. at 1196. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
230. 726 F.2d at 1196-97.
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reluctance to join the CSF was determinative of the predisposition issue. 231 The court observed that there may have been numerous reasons

for Thoma's reluctance. 232 Moreover, there is a presumption that the
trier of fact considers all these inferences 2 33 when making its decision.
Since the fact finder did not think that Thoma's reluctance evidenced a
lack of predisposition, 234 the entrapment defense failed.

The court also rejected Thoma's argument that the government's
inducement was such that "his capitulation cannot be ascribed to predisposition."' 2 3" The court held that the government merely offered the de-

fendant an opportunity to engage in both legal and illegal conduct. 236
The court further stated that "the mailings of CSF were spread out over
a period of time and, unlike personal contact, could easily be ignored by
one not interested in their contents. ' 23 7 In addition, the court observed
that it was significant that Thoma set the sale price on the tapes he solicited through the mails.

238

Accordingly, the court held that the govern-

ment merely offered Thoma an opportunity to commit a crime and this,
coupled with what can at most be described as mild inducement, did not
239
support a claim of entrapment.
Similarly, the court rejected Thoma's due process argument that
a) a standard lower than "truly outrageous" governmental conduct
should be applied to the case, and b) if the "truly outrageous" standard is
applied, the government's conduct clearly met this standard. 24°
Thoma's first argument was based on the grounds that the government violated his constitutional right to possess pornographic material in
his own home by "luring" him into placing this material in the mails.
The court agreed that the defendant did have a constitutional right to
keep such material in his home, 24' but held that this right had not been
violated. It is significant, however, that the court stated that had
Thoma's constitutional right been violated, the "truly outrageous" stan231. The court stated: "Reluctance at joining CSF, which was not itself illegal and which offered both legal and illegal activities, cannot be equated with reluctance at committing the prohibited
mailings." Id. at 1197.
232. Id.
233. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
234. 726 F.2d at 1197.
235. Id.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1197-98. Thoma was indicted for mailing for the purpose of sale obscene material
that involved the use of minors engaged in sexual conduct; a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1).
239. 726 F.2d at 1197-1198.
240. Id. at 1198-99.
241. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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dard would not have applied. 242 Although this is only dicta, it is important to note that up until now courts have not considered lessening or
modifying the standard of proof in an "outrageous governmental conduct" allegation. In fact, courts have adhered to it very closely and only
a few litigants have prevailed on this theory. 243 The Thoma court held
that because Thoma willingly sold his tapes, he was not impermissibly
244
induced into leaving the zone of protection under Stanley v. Georgia
but that he in fact chose to forfeit that protection in order to make a
profit.

24 5

The court further held that in light of the past cases, the government's conduct was not outrageous. 246 In cases where the government's
conduct was deemed outrageous, the government was more intimately
involved in the illegal conduct, and such involvement warrants a closer
247
inspection of its conduct.

The Thoma court was also concerned with predisposed defendants
using the outrageous governmental conduct defense to escape prosecution. Thus it held that the defense was not available to predisposed defendants.

24 8

Although this is a legitimate concern, it could be argued that

the court erred on this point. The outrageous governmental conduct defense focuses on the government's conduct, not on whether the defendant
was predisposed. 249 The defendant's predisposition, or lack of it, is not
an issue. The concern in this defense is whether the government, by engaging in a certain type of conduct, violated an individual's constitu242. 726 F.2d at 1198.
243. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783 (9th Cir. 1981).
244. See supra note 241.
245. 726 F.2d at 1198.
246. The court stated that
• . . those members of the Supreme Court who have recognized that due process is violated
by outrageous Government conduct have drawn a line between situations in which the
Government provides contraband and those in which it does not. Similarly, we will closely
examine those cases in which the Government misconduct injures third parties in some
way.
Id. at 1199 (citations omitted). See U.S. v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (government supplied
chemicals, glassware, and farmhouse used in manufacturing narcotics; informer did lion's share of
manufacturing); Greene v. U.S., 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (government supplied ingredients for
manufacture of illicit whiskey and was only purchaser of final product); Hampton v. U.S., 425 U.S.
484, 498 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 657-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
247. 726 F.2d at 1199.
248. Id. The court stated that
[w]hen a defendant is predisposed to commit the offense due process cannot be violated by
Government inducement; to hold otherwise would be to allow a predisposed defendant to
raise the functional equivalent of an entrapment defense-a result at odds with the
Supreme Court's holdings in this area.
Id. See also U.S. v. Janotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir. 1982).
249. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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tional right. 250
V.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

A.

Pretrial

In United States v. Bunch,2 5 1 a case of first impression, the Seventh
Circuit held that a district court judge who tentatively accepted a defendant's plea agreement, then read a presentencing report and subsequently
rejected the plea agreement, was not required to recuse himself from presiding over the defendant's trial.
The defendant argued that the judge should have recused himself
because he may have been prejudiced from the "premature disclosure" of
the report. 252 The defendant relied on Gregg v. United States.253 In

Gregg, the Supreme Court emphasized that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), 254 it is error to submit a presentence report to a

judge prior to a defendant's plea of guilty or a finding of guilt.
The court distinguished Bunch from Gregg on the basis that the presentencing report in Bunch was submitted after the defendant's plea of
guilty. 255 Therefore Rule 32(c)(1) was not violated. Additionally, the

court concluded that the judge's decision to recuse himself was a matter
of discretion subject only to the appellate court's limited review. 25 6 The
court stated that the lower court judgment could only be set aside if the
defendant could demonstrate an abuse of discretion or actual prejudice. 25 7 The court found that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice

particularly because the jury, rather than the judge, was the fact finder
and the judge did not have occasion to rule on any objections in front of
the jury during trial. Accordingly, the court held that the district court
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
(c)

Id.
730 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 518.
394 U.S. 489 (1969).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) provides:
Presentence Investigation.
(1) When Made. The probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of
probation unless, with the permission of the court, the defendant waives a presentence
investigation and report, or the court finds that there is in the record information
sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion, and the court
explains this finding on the record.
The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone
unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been found guilty,
except that a judge may, with the written consent of the defendant, inspect a
presentence report at any time.
255. Bunch, 730 F.2d at 519.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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did not err in denying the defendant's motion for recusal. 258
B.

Jury Selection

In United States v. Gometz, 259 the defendant presented a novel argu-

ment on appeal, challenging the selection of his jury. Gometz contended
that 1) his sixth amendment right had been violated because blacks had
been under-represented on the master jury wheel, 26° and 2) he had been
denied his right under the Jury Selection and Service Act, 26 1 (Jury Act)
to a hearing to determine whether the jury wheel was truly
representative.
The court rejected Gometz's first contention because the number of
blacks on the jury wheel was not disproportionate to the number of
blacks in the Southern District of Illinois counties. Gometz failed to
prove "[s]ystematic discrimination against counties with large black
262
populations.
With respect to his second contention, Gometz argued that blacks
constituted the vast majority of people who did not return their juror
qualification forms, and, because of this, blacks were under-represented
on the qualified jury wheel. 263 The court, however, held that there was no
evidence to support this theory. 264 Specifically, Gometz's jury was selected from thirty veniremen, one of whom was black. The black population of that area was 3.9%;265 this juror represented 3.33% of the black
population. 266 The court held that this discrepancy was insignificant.
Gometz further argued that the Jury Act imposed a duty on the
court to follow up on people who did not respond to questionnaires. 267
However, the court observed that the committee reports to the Jury Act
only required courts to follow up on these people when the number of
names on the qualified jury wheel was insufficient to staff the number of
juries required. 268 The court also said that while the Jury Act empowered
258. Id.
259. 730 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1984).
260. Id. at 477.

261. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et. seq. (1982).
262. Gometz, 730 F.2d at 478.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 479.
268. If the voter lists are used and supplemented where necessary, and if the procedures
outlined in the bill are otherwise rigorously followed, it is no departure from the standards
of the legislation that the qualified jury wheel, the venire or array, or the jury itself, may
not reflect a community cross section. The act . . .does not require that at any stage
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269
a court to summon people who failed to respond to the questionnaires,
it was not required to do so.
In essence the Gometz court viewed the purpose of the Jury Act as
making it possible for all qualified persons to serve as jurors; 270 this is
very different from forcing all qualified people to be available for jury
27
service. 1
As a practical matter, courts do not have the time or the manpower
to summon and prosecute people who do not respond to the questionnaires. An accurate representation of the community on each jury is the
ideal. But without more effective administrative resources, it is unlikely
that courts can effect this desired result. The Gometz court referred to
this problem in dicta. 272 The court also remarked that even if a court
could pursue all those people who failed to respond, there was the distinct possibility that this would lead to more harm than good. It is inadvisable to force someone to serve as a juror because an angry juror is a
273
bad juror.

C.

Right to Counsel

It is well settled that criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel once legal proceedings have been commenced against
them. 274 In Young v. Duckworth27 5 however, the Seventh Circuit was
faced with a novel aspect of that proposition: must a criminal conviction
be set aside when the defendant was not represented by counsel between
27 6
the time of his preliminary examination and his arraignment?
John Young was arrested in Alabama in connection with a murder
charge that arose in Indiana. 277 He was immediately returned to Indiana
and appeared for a preliminary examination in municipal court, where he
was represented by a public defender. 278 Upon finding probable cause,
the case was bound over to a grand jury. Three months later, at his
beyond the initial source list the selection process should produce groups that accurately
mirror community makeup. Thus no challenge lies on that basis.
Id. at 479-80 citing to S. Rep. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 at 17 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1076,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 1794 (1968).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a). See also United States v. Santo, 588 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
270. Id. at 480.
271. Id.
272. Gometz, 730 F.2d at 480-1.
273. Id.
274. See generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
275. 733 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1984).
276. Id. at 483.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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arraignment, he was represented by another public defender. Ten
279
months after his arraignment, he was convicted of first degree murder.
The conviction was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. 280 Young
2
subsequently filed a petition of habeas corpus in federal district court . 8
In federal district court, Young claimed he was denied his constitutionally protected right to counsel during the three month lapse between
the preliminary hearing and his arraignment. Consequently, he argued
that his conviction should be overturned. The court disagreed, and
Young appealed.

28

2

The court of appeal's decision, written by Judge Posner, contained
three main findings: first, legal proceedings had been commenced against
Young when he was first brought to Indiana since the purpose of the
preliminary hearing was to ascertain whether there was sufficient evidence to justify presenting Young's case to a grand jury. Therefore,
Young's right to counsel attached at that point. 283 Second, the mere
lapse in representation of counsel did not in and of itself deprive Young
of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 28 4 Third, the lapse in representation of counsel did not justify nullifying Young's conviction unless the
28 5
lapse prejudiced him in defending himself against the criminal charge.
As a result, the court remanded the case to the district court so that a
factual record could be compiled to establish whether Young was
prejudiced by the lapse. This discussion will focus on this third point.
Although the court refused to label it as such, its analysis followed
Supreme Court precedent established in many of the 'harmless-error'
cases. 28 6 In the 'harmless error' cases the Supreme Court has recognized
that criminal convictions may stand despite constitutional errors that occurred during the defendant's trial, providing the conviction would have
resulted despite the error.
Curiously, the court of appeals failed to enunciate a standard of review that it would employ in determining whether Young was harmed by
the lapse. Theoretically, the court could employ the "reasonable possibility" standard which the Supreme Court adopted in Chapman v. Cali279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Young v. State, 267 Ind. 434, 370 N.E.2d 903 (1977).
Young, 733 F.2d at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.

285. Id.
286. See generally Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
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fornia.2 87 Under that standard, Young's conviction would be overturned
if he could show that there was a reasonable possibility that a three
month lapse in representation contributed to his conviction. However,
Chapman involved a fifth amendment violation. Although the reasonable possibility standard has been relied on in other sixth amendment
cases, 288 none of those cases presented the same issues for review as
Young v. Duckworth289 presents.
As a practical matter, the court noted that criminal defendants often
switch counsel during the course of their trials. 290 Therefore, if the court
employed a standard of less than "reasonable possibility," defendants
would have access to a large loophole allowing them to avoid conviction
by merely firing their attorneys and not informing the court. Also, a less
than "reasonable possibility" standard would clothe the court with an
additional supervisory role, demanding its attention to assure that all
criminal defendants always have counsel.
Overall, Young v. Duckworth 29' is a sound decision. Absence of
counsel is a serious irreversable error. 29 2 Young's basis of appeal, however, was a lapse, not an absence, of counsel. While a continued lapse
may become as serious as an absence, a defendant should be forced to
prove that he experienced a harm commensurate with an absence of
counsel in order to obtain an automatic reversal. Otherwise, the court
could infer that the lapse was a non-prejudicial harmless error, and his
conviction would stand.
D. Joint Representation
In Wilson v. Morris,293 the Seventh Circuit held that when an attorney represents two defendants on the same charges and objects to consolidation of the cases at a preliminary hearing, the court does not have a
sua sponte duty to inquire into the propriety of joint representation, ab294
sent special circumstances.
Wilson and Tyler were arrested and charged with rape and robbery. 29 5 Both defendants appeared together for preliminary examination
287.
288.
Frazen,
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

386 U.S. at 22.
Cyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Wade v.
678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).
733 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 484.
733 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1984).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
724 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2357 (1984).
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 592.
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and were represented by the same public defender. 296 Over the public
defender's objection, the court granted the prosecutor's motion to consolidate the cases for preliminary examination. 297 Both defendants were
subsequently tried for rape and robbery and were represented by the
same public defender at separate trials. 298 During their trials, the public
defender neither reaffirmed his prior objection, nor made a new objection
to representing both defendants. 299 Wilson and Tyler were both convicted and sentenced. Wilson filed a petition of habeas corpus contesting
joint representation by the public defender at the preliminary hearing
3 °°
and at the trial.
At an en banc hearing, the court rejected Wilson's appeal. The
court distinguished between an objection to joint representation made at
a preliminary hearing and a similar objection made at trial. 30 1 The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable
30 2
cause, as opposed to ascertaining the defendant's guilt or innocence.
The court reasoned that an attorney's warning of a potential conflict
made at a preliminary hearing does not imply that the same conflict will
exist at trial. Therefore, when an attorney objects at a preliminary hearing, but fails to object during the trial, the defendant must prove that he
was harmed by the joint representation in order to establish a constitutional violation. 30 3 If, however, the attorney makes an objection at trial
and is overruled without an inquiry into its basis, the defendant need not
prove he was harmed by the conflict to establish a constitutional violation. 30 4 Accordingly, for Wilson to prevail on appeal, he had to prove
that an actual conflict of interest affected his defense attorney's performance. 30 5 Wilson failed to do so, and lost his appeal.
Because Wilson's counsel failed to object to joint representation at
trial, and the court refused to carry the initial objection over from the
preliminary hearing, the record was devoid of any circumstances creating
a sua sponte duty by the court to inquire into the propriety of joint representation. The court of appeals specifically refused to comment on
whether it was prudent of the state court not to inquire into the adequacy
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 593.

301. Id. at 595.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 594; see also Cyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).

304. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
305. Wilson, 724 F.2d at 594.
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of joint representation. 30 6 But the court of appeals did state that joint
30 7
representation in and of itself is not a special circumstance.
The Wilson opinion is well reasoned and consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Holloway v. Arkansas.30 8 In Holloway, the
Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the constitutional guarantee of effective counsel occurs when an objection to joint representation
made by counsel is overruled by the trial court without an inquiry into its
basis. 30 9 By refusing to allow Wilson's attorney's objection to carry over
to trial, the court of appeals accurately recognized the difference between
the various phases of a criminal prosecution. Also, by refusing to acknowledge a sua sponte duty by the court to investigate the adequacy of
counsel, the court avoided hypothesizing about a situation which would
create the necessary absent "special circumstances." Therefore, the decision was correct.
In United States ex rel. Gray v. Director,Departmentof Corrections,
State of Illinois, 310 [hereinafter referred to as Gray] the trial court probably should have made a sua sponte inquiry into the propriety of joint
representation. Since it did not, and joint representation continued, the
court of appeals reversed a state court's conviction and established a test
for determining when a conflict exists between defendants represented by
the same attorney.
When she was 17 years old, Paula Gray, who is mentally retarded,
observed, but did not participate in, a gruesome robbery, kidnap, rape
and murder. 311 During the police investigation into the crime, Paula
came forward, on her mother's urging, and gave a statement which implicated Williams, Adams, Rainge and Jimmerson. 31 2 Since she lived in
the same neighborhood as the implicated defendants, Paula was concerned about her safety. At the suggestion of the State's Attorney office,
Paula was temporarily relocated prior to testifying before a grand jury. 3 13
Shortly thereafter, the Gray family was put in touch with Archie Weston, an attorney who was representing three of the four implicated
3t 4
defendants.
306. Id. at 595.
307. Id. at 594-95.
308. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
309. Id. at 488.
310. 721 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1690 (1984).
311. Id. at 587-88.
312. Id. at 589.
313. Id. at 589-90.
314. Id. at 590. The court indicated that since the Williams family was so close to Mrs. Gray
and was obviously interested in Paula because of her potential for giving implicating testimony, it
was the Williams family which gave Weston's phone number to Mrs. Gray. Id.
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Subsequently, Paula testified under oath before the grand jury. She
recounted the story which she had already told the police and State's
Attorney, including William's threats against her life should she come
forward. 3 15 At Paula's request, and out of concern for her safety, she
was relocated for one night after the grand jury hearing. Following that
3 16
night, Paula asked to return to her family.
A few days after she moved back in with her family, Paula and her
family moved in with the Williams family. 3 17 About that same time,
Paula and her family began having additional contacts with Archie Wes31 8
ton concerning her testimony about Williams, Rainge and Jimmerson.
A month later, Paula testified as a State's witness at a preliminary hearing against Williams, Rainge and Jimmerson. She arrived at the hearing
319
holding hands with Weston.
She testified that she knew nothing about the crimes committed by
the defendants and that she had been forced by the police to make prior
statements before the grand jury. Absent her testimony, the charges
against Jimmerson were dismissed, but the charges against Williams, Rainge and Adams were sustained. 320 Paula then left the courtroom with
Weston.
An information was filed against Williams, Rainge and Adams
charging them with the crimes committed by them as principals. Subsequently, an information was filed against Paula for aiding and abetting,
and for perjury at the preliminary hearing. When the indictment against
Paula was filed, Weston entered a formal appearance as her attorney. 32'
Williams, Rainge and Adams were all found guilty. The state informed the court that it would seek the death penalty against all three.
The jury concluded that Williams should be sentenced to death. Rainge
322
and Adams were sentenced to long prison terms.
Paula was found guilty of aiding and abetting, as well as perjury.
She was sentenced to 50 years for the aiding and abetting charge and 10
years for perjury. 323 The Supreme Court of Illinois subsequently dis324
barred Weston for improper conduct in an unrelated matter.
315.
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317.
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319.
320.
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595; see also In re Weston, 92 Ill. 2d 431, 442 N.E.2d 236 (1982).
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On appeal before the Illinois Appellate Court, Paula's court appointed counsel argued that Paula's constitutional right to conflict-free
counsel was violated since Weston represented Paula, Williams and Rainge. 325 The Illinois Appellate Court disagreed, and Paula's conviction
was affirmed. She petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal, but was denied. Paula's court appointed counsel then filed a27writ of
3
326
The writ was denied.
habeas corpus with the district court.
During the interim, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that there
was sufficient evidence to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. But rather then affirm the conviction, the court reversed and remanded it to the circuit court for a new trial to determine whether Weston's misconduct in the unrelated matter had any bearing on the quality
of his representation. 328 Paula then filed a motion for a new trial, or
alternatively for reconsideration of her leave to appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 329 The motion was denied "without prejudice to [Paula]
'3 30
Paula
to file a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court.
then appealed from the district court's decision denying her writ of
habeas corpus.
In an opinion by Judge Wyatt, 331 the court of appeals concluded
that there was an actual conflict of interest between Paula and her codefendants. The court noted that because of her age when the crimes
were committed, and since she was merely an eyewitness, Paula was not
subject to the death penalty. 332 Williams, on the other hand, was over 21,
had a criminal record which included guilty pleas from prior felonies and
was actively involved in the robbery, kidnap, rape and murder in the
333
instant case. Consequently, Williams was subject to the death penalty.
The court noted that an "independent, conflict-free, competent attorney for Paula would. . . have carefully considered continued cooperation with the State as a means of avoiding any prosecution ...
immunity . . . [including] a plea bargain. ' 334 Because Weston represented Williams and Paula, a conflict existed since Williams' defense
325. Gray, 721 F.2d at 593-94; See also People v. Gray, 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150,
appeal denied, 81 Ill. 2d 604 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981).
326. Gray, 721 F.2d at 594.
327. Id. at 595.
328. Id.; See also People v. Williams, 93 Ill. 2d 309, 444 N.E.2d 136 (1982).
329. Gray, 721 F.2d at 595.
330. Id.
331. Sitting by designation.
332. Id. at 596.
333. Id. at 597.
334. Id. at 596.
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could be harmed by Paula's cooperation with the state. 335
The court held that "[t]he test for conflict between defendants is not
whether the defenses actually chosen by them are consistent but whether
in making the choice of defenses the interests of the defendants were in
conflict." '3 36 So long as Weston represented Williams, he was not con-

flict-free and could not make an independent judgment. Consequently,
the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and granted
Paula's writ of habeas corpus, subject to the state's election to retry her
337
within a reasonable length of time.

The decision is well reasoned and fair, but given the uniqueness of
the fact situation, it is unclear what precedential value it provides. It
should, however, provide the courts with an opportunity to observe when
a sua sponte inquiry into joint representation would have been appropriate, given Weston's interest in Paula and her radical change in testimony
between the time of the grand jury and the preliminary hearing.
E. Right to Cross-examine Witnesses
In United States v. Key, 338 the defendant's conviction was partially

reversed because the introduction of a statement by a non-testifying codefendant violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to cross-examine a witness.
Key was charged under a seven count indictment for using the mails
to defraud insurance companies, submitting false receipts for losses, and
falsely representing to an insurer that he had been injured in an automobile accident.339 Prior to trial, Key filed a motion in limine requesting
that the government be prohibited from introducing a statement given by
Key's codefendant. The trial judge denied his motion and Key was subsequently convicted.

34

0

The charges arose from an alleged accident involving automobiles
driven by the co-defendant and Key, and an insurance claim which was
subsequently filed by Key. The government sought to prove through a
number of witnesses that the accident never occurred. One of those witnesses testified that the co-defendant had admitted to him that the acci34
dent never occurred. 1

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 597 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 598.
725 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1125.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
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The court agreed with Key that under Bruton v. United States,342 it
was improper to introduce the witness' testimony regarding the co-defendant's confessions without giving Key the opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. 34 3 The court noted that the co-defendant's
confession was "the only proof of fraud that the accident was staged,"
344
and therefore constituted a crucial part of the government's case.
345
Consequently, Key was distinguishable from United States v. Madison,
where independent proof sufficed to convict the defendant, aside from the
proof deduced from the potentially incriminating statements. Since the
decision accurately identifies the extent of a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause,346 it was correctly decided.
F

Right to a Speedy Trial

The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Janik34 7 provides
an in-depth analysis of the application and purpose of the Speedy Trial
Act 348 (Trial Act). In Janik, the defendant was indicted on October 27,
198 1349 following the discovery of firearms in his apartment on March
26, 198 1.350 He was eventually convicted for possession of two unregistered guns. 35 1 On appeal, Janik contended that his sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial had been violated by the court's delay in ruling on
his pre-trial motion to suppress.
The Janik court observed that although the purpose of the Trial Act
is "to implement the sixth amendment's right to a speedy trial, ' 352 the
sixth amendment is only implicated when charges are pending against
the defendant. 35 3 The court held that Janik's sixth amendment rights
attached when he was arraigned on November 4, 1981. 354 The court
342. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
343. Burton, 391 U.S. at 135-36; Key, 725 F.2d at 1127.
344. Key, 725 F.2d at 1126.
345. 689 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1983).
346. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him
U.S. CONST. amend. XI, § 2.
347. 723 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1983).
348. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et. seq. (1982).
349. 723 F.2d at 541.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 542.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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therefore confined its analysis to delays after this date. 355
The Trial Act provides that a defendant's trial must be commenced
within 70 days of his arraignment. 356 The various subsections of the
Trial Act allow for excludable time.357 Because there was a delay of
fourteen and one-half months before Janik was tried, it was necessary to
see whether this delay was permitted by the "excludable time" provisions
of the Trial Act. The parties in Janik agreed that forty-two days between
the arraignment and trial were not excludable. Thus, of the 70 day excludable time allowance, only 28 days remained. Because more than 28
days elapsed in Janik, the court considered whether the remaining days
were "excludable time" under the other provisions of the Trial Act.
The Janik court identified three periods at issue: 35 8 1) the seventy
day delay beginning February 5, 1982 when the hearing was cancelled
until a new date could be set; 2) the sixty-eight days between September
5, 1982 and November 12; and 3) the thirty-one days between the order
to re-open the hearing and the disposition of the motion to suppress. All
of these delays occurred during the defendant's motion to suppress and,
3 59
as the court said, they were arguably excludable under the Trial Act.
The court said that the words "other prompt disposition" in the statute
imposed a limitation on the longevity of pre-trial motions. 36° The court
stated that the Trial Act defined these words in § 3161(1)(1)(J),361 which
allows an additional 30 excludable days while a matter is under the advisement of a court. While § 3161(l)(1)(J) does not specifically refer to
pre-trial motions, the Janik court held that based on legislative history it
was only logical that this section should apply to pre-trial motions covered by § 3161(h)(1)(F). 362 A contrary conclusion would allow a judge
355. Id. The significant dates in Janik's trial are: November 23, 1983 (Janik moved to suppress
the evidence seized on March 26, 1981); February 5, 1982 (hearing on motion set for this date but
later cancelled by the court due to administrative problems); April 28 and May 3, 1982 (hearing on
motion took place); August 6, 1982 (last post-hearing brief filed; court took matter under advisement); November 12, 1982 (court ordered hearing re-opened); December 2, 1982 (additional testimony taken); December 13, 1982 (motion denied).
356. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982).
357. The Trial Act allows a certain number of days to elapse between the various stages of the
proceedings. These periods of delay are excluded under the act and are not taken into consideration
when determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. It is only delays in
excess of this excludable time that can constitute a violation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et. seq. (1982).
358. Janik, 723 F.2d at 543.
359. Id. The court observed that under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(F) delays resulting from pre-trial
motions "from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of such motion constitute excludable time."
360. Id.
361. This section states that "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of such motion" shall
constitute excludable time. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1982).
362. S. Rep. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). This report explicitly stated that the
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more than thirty days to decide pre-trial motions but only thirty days to
decide all other motions. This argument has been considered and re363
jected by other circuits.
In applying this statutory interpretation the Janik court held that
the February 5th delay was not excludable. 364 It was not significant that
365
this delay was due to administrative inefficiencies or a crowded docket.
The Trial Act was designed to induce federal court judges to clear up
congested dockets rather than to rely on them as an excuse for delaying
366
trials.
The Janik court further held that this delay could not be excluded
under § 3161(h)(8)(A). 367 This section provides for excludable continuances but, as the court observed, it rejects the "general congestion of [a]
' 368
court's calendar as a ground for an excludable continuance.
Similarly, the court held that the second delay was not excludable. 369 After taking the matter under advisement on August 6, 1982, the

trial court had thirty days, 370 or until September 5, 1982, to rule on the
motion. Section 3161(h)(8)(A) allows a judge to grant a continuance on
his or counsel's motion. 37' However, in Janik the trial court failed to
grant a continuance at the appropriate time. Thus, the period between
September 5, 1981 and November 12, 1981 was not excludable under this
section. The court observed that although the trial judge found that the
words "prompt disposition" were not intended to circumvent the requirements of § 3161 (h)(1)(J) of
the Trial Act.
363. See United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bufalino,
683 F.2d 639, 642-44 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. DeLong Champs, 679 F.2d 217, 220 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
364. Janik, 723 F.2d at 543.
365. See note 342 and accompanying text. Janik's hearing on the motion to suppress was originally set for February 5, 1982. See note 342. This hearing had to be cancelled because the minute
clerk was on maternity leave and the new clerk did not begin work until late February, at which time
there were over 400 cases on the court's docket. Id. at 542.
366. Id. at 542, citing United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1982); H.R. Rep. No.
1508, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
367. Janik, 723 F.2d at 544-5.
368. Id.
369. Id. See note 355 and accompanying text.
370. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (1982).
(8)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his
own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant on a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable
under the subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in
writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
371. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1982).
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ends of justice warranted the delays,3 72 "the continuance itself must be
' 373
granted before the period sought to be excluded begins to run.
The third delay 374 was also held not excludable. The court rejected

both arguments advanced for its exclusion.3 75 The first argument was
that a) the period between November 12, 1982 (when the hearing was
ordered reopened) and December 2, 1982 (when additional testimony
was taken) was excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F) because this was the
period between the filing and the hearing of a pre-trial motion; 376 and
b) the period between December 2 and December 13 should be excluded
under § 3161(h)(1)(J) because it fell within the thirty day exclusion period allowed for matters under the advisement of the court. The Janik
court did not reach the question of whether the matter was under the
court's advisement, but held that "the requirements of prompt disposition in § 3161 (h)(1)(F) may not be circumvented by indefinitely deferring
the scheduling of the hearing, no more may it be circumvented by ordering the hearing re-opened more than 30 days after the matter has been
taken under advisement.

'377

The defendant also argued that the order to reopen the hearing constituted a continuance, excludable under § 3161(h)(8)(A). 378 The court
rejected this argument on the ground that "[o]nly continuances based on
'findings that the ends of justice . . .outweigh the best interest of the

public and the defendant in a speedy trial' create excludable time" under
§ 3161(h)(8)(A). 379 Since the trial court judge did not make any such
finding at the time she ordered the hearing re-opened, this period did not
fall under § 3161(h)(8)(A). The Janik court observed that when the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment due to violations of the Trial
Act was denied, the district judge found that this period could have been
excluded under § 3161(h)(8)(A). 380 Nonetheless, the appellate court
held that this reference to § 3161(h)(8)(A) was not sufficient to "satisfy
the Trial Act's requirement of specific findings showing that the exclu'38 1
sion is justified."
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Janik, 723 F.2d at 545.
Id.
See note 355 and accompanying text.
Id. at 544.
Id. See also notes 359-368 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. See also note 371.

379. Id.
380. Id. at 545.
381. The court observed that:
If the judge gives no indication that a continuance was granted upon a balancing of the
factors specified by the Speedy Trial Act until asked to dismiss the indictment for violation
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Essentially, the Janik court did not break any new ground in the
application and interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act. 382 It affirmed its
decisions in prior cases 383 and underlined the fact that the Seventh Cir384
cuit's position conforms with that of other circuits.
The Seventh Circuit also addressed a defendant's right to a speedy
trial in Terry v. Duckworth. 385 In Terry a warrant was issued for the
defendant's arrest in connection with an alleged robbery, on March 15,
1975. The warrant, however, stated the wrong address. 386 Consequently, the police were not able to arrest Terry until November 14, 1977
when he was stopped for an expired auto safety sticker. The trial for the
alleged robbery commenced on August 14, 1985, and Terry testified that
due to the forty month delay between the issuance of the warrant and the
trial, he was unable to remember anything concerning his whereabouts
387
on the day of the alleged robbery.
The sole issue before the trial court was whether the thirty-two
month delay between the issuance of the warrant and Terry's arrest violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. The appellate court
observed that whenever a person is accused of a crime, the sixth amendment is implicated. In Terry the defendant was accused of robbery when
the information was filed against him on March 19, 1975.388 The court
applied the test formulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo 389
to determine whether Terry's sixth amendment rights had been violated.
That test balances 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay;
3) the timeliness of defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the resultant
390
prejudice to the defendant.
of the Act, the danger is great that every continuance will be converted retroactively into a
continuance creating excludable time ....
Id. at 544-5.
382. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et. seq. (1982).
383. See United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Carlone, 666
F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1981) (section 3161(h)(8)(A) does not apply to continuances granted after the
fact).
384. See United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 386 (3d Cir. 1981) wherein the court states that § 3161(h)(8)(A) does not apply
to continuances granted after the fact. See also United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.
1982) (a congested docket is not grounds for an excludable continuance under § 3161(h)(8)(c);
United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38, 43 (2d. Cir. 1982) (the words "prompt disposition" in
§ 3161(h)(1)(F) are defined by § 3161(h)(1)(J) to mean no more than 30 days).
385. 715 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983).
386. Id. at 1218.
387. Id. This was a critical part of Terry's defense; the victim had identified Terry from police
photograph files and in order to rebut this identification Terry had to show that he was somewhere
else at the time of the robbery.
388. Id. at 1219.
389. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
390. Id. at 530.
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With respect to the length of the delay, the Terry court said that
although Barker did not specify durational limits, it did state that the
prejudicial effect of a delay depended on the nature of the crime. 39' Because Terry was only accused of an ordinary street crime, the court held
392
that a thirty-two month delay was presumptively prejudicial.
The court found that the reason for the delay was the state's negligence. Under Barker, both negligent and intentional attempts to cause a
delay weigh heavily against the government, but a negligent delay weighs
less heavily. 393 This is the general rule in the Seventh Circuit. 394 There-

fore, the Terry court held that this factor weighed in the defendant's
95
favor.
In considering the timeliness of the defendant's assertion of his
right, the court observed that Terry filed his motion to dismiss the indictment three and one-half months after his arrest. 396 The court held that
of the pending
although this was not timely, the fact that he was unaware
397
charge and outstanding warrant weighed in his favor.
The fourth factor in this balancing process, the prejudice to the defendant, caused the greatest concern for the court. The court observed
that the right to a speedy trial protects three interests: 1) the prevention
of oppressive pre-trial incarceration; 2) the minimization of the anxiety
and concern the defendant must endure; and 3) a reduction of the risk
that the accused's defense will be impaired. Only this last concern was at
issue in Terry. Upon examining the record, it was evident that Terry's
defense had not been impaired because he could not remember his whereabouts on the date of the alleged robbery.3 98 Accordingly, the court held
that since only two of the four factors weighed "moderately" in Terry's
391. Terry, 715 F.2d at 1219 citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
392. Id.
393. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
394. Terry, 715 F.2d at 1220, citing United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980)
(negligence to be weighed less heavily than intentional delay); Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 686
(7th Cir. 1979) (absence of reason for delay should be weighed against the state); United States v.
Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1976) (failure to account for delay must be weighed against the
state); United States v. Lockett, 526 F.2d 1110, 1111-12 (7th Cir. 1975) (government's failure to give
a reason tends to favor defense).
395. Terry, 715 F.2d at 1219.
396. Id. at 1220.
397. Id.
398. The court stated that:
The jury had the opportunity to observe Terry's demeanor on the witness stand and to
judge his credibility. The jury did not believe him. By returning a verdict of guilty, we
may assume that the jury found that Terry did recall his whereabouts and activities on the
night of March 5, 1975, and that his loss of memory was merely a convenient alibi.
Id. at 1221.
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favor, his right to a speedy trial had not been violated. 399
The dissent sharply disagreed with the majority's analysis and application of the fourth factor.40° The dissent defined the critical legal issue
as "how. . .one [can] demonstrate a complete loss of memory for purposes of showing actual prejudice in a speedy trial context." 40 1 The majority had avoided this issue, the dissent said, by relying on a illogical
syllogism: if a man says he cannot defend himself because the passage of
time has eradicated his memory, then a guilty verdict means the man is
lying. 40 2 The dissent said that this was illogical because "a general guilty
verdict extends only to those facts necessary to support the elements of
the crime charged. Loss of memory is neither a denial nor a defense to
any element of the crime of robbery. ' 40 3 Thus, the majority erroneously
concluded that Terry had been lying simply by focusing on the guilty
verdict. 404
Furthermore, the majority and the lower court agreed that a thirtytwo month delay was presumptively prejudicial and yet neither of these
courts gave Terry the benefit of that presumption. 40 5 When this case was
before the Indiana Court of Appeals, the court advanced a similar concern: "In practical terms could we reconstruct our activities on a day
''
which occurred two and one-half years ago? I doubt it. 406
There were, however, strong policy reasons for the court's position
in Terry. If the court had been more sympathetic to the significant delay,
it might have been obliged to give greater weight to this one factor in
future cases. Evidently, the court was concerned about future defendants
using a "loss of memory" excuse in order to get an indictment dismissed
and therefore did not want this case to act as precedent for the proposition that a significant delay is highly probative of a defendant's alleged
loss of memory. Absent more substantial proof of loss of memory the
presumption that the delay was not prejudicial would be made in favor of
the government.
VI.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In Walsh v. Brewer 40 7 the court decided the rights of an inmate who
399. Id. at 1222.
400. Id. (Cambell J.,dissenting).
401. Id.

402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.

406. Terry v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Ind. App. 1980).
407. 733 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1984).
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claimed that his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights were violated
when he was assaulted while in Statesville.
While incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center during 1973,
Walsh helped prison officers repel an attack by inmate members of two
street gangs. 4 08 In 1978, Walsh was sent to Statesville for three felony
convictions. Because he feared reprisal attacks for his role at Menard,
Walsh asked to be put in protective custody. 4° 9 His request was denied,
so he intentionally committed a disciplinary violation in order to be put
in twenty-four hour lockup, which he felt offered protection comparable
to protective custody. He was assigned to an empty cell. Subsequently,
an inmate member of one of the street gangs which Walsh feared was
assigned to Walsh's cell, over Walsh's objections. Later that day, Walsh
410
was stabbed and found hanging with the gang member next to him.
Walsh brought a civil rights action for damages. 4 11 He argued that the

prison guards and warden were responsible for Walsh's security while at
Statesville, and their failure to adequately protect him deprived him of
his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The district court agreed. It determined that placing a gang member in Walsh's cell constituted deliberate indifference toward Walsh's
safety and violated his constitutional rights against cruel and unusual
punishment. 41 2 However, the district court held that the guards were not
liable to Walsh for damages because Walsh failed to prove that depriva41 3
tion of his constitutional rights was the proximate cause of his injuries.
The court of appeals determined that the lower court's analysis was
incomplete because it did not adequately explain the basis for its conclusion that Walsh's constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, while
Walsh claimed that the prison guards allowed an atmosphere of lawlessness to prevail at Statesville, the district court failed to discuss whether
the evidence proved that Statesville inmates were exposed to an unconstitutionally high risk of harm. The court of appeals held that for Walsh to
prevail, he would have to establish that prison conditions amounted to a
408. Id. at 475.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Every person who, under cotor of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
412. Walsh, 733 F.2d at 475-76.
413. Id. at 476.
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"reign of terror.

' 41 4

Since the district court's opinion did not discuss

of harm prevailed, the decision
whether this unconstitutionally high risk
41 5
was reversed for further consideration.

The appeals court directed the lower court to formulate its conclusion after considering whether 1) assaults occurred so frequently that
they were "pervasive" or 2) whether Walsh belonged to "an identifiable
group of prisoners for whom assault was a serious problem of substantial
4 16
dimensions." Absent proof of these factors, Walsh's claim would fail.
In Heirens v. Mizell,41 7 the court held that application of a provision
of an Illinois parole statute to prisoners who had committed crimes prior
to the statute's effective date would not violate the ex postfacto clause of
the United States constitution. 418 The court thereby reversed its decision
in Welsh v. Mizel 4 19 where it previously held that application of the same
provision was unconstitutional. The parole statute 420 was enacted in
1972. The provision in question directed the Illinois parole board to
deny a prisoner parole if "his release at that time would deprecate the
' 42 1
The
seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law."

Welsh court held that the statute directed the parole board, for the first
time, to consider principles of "general deterence" and "retributive justice" 4 22 when making parole decisions. Therefore, the court found that
application of the provision to prisoners who had committed their crimes
prior to the statute's effective date violated the ex post facto clause.
In Heirens, the court re-examined its decision in Welsh while reviewing a magistrate's order for the release of Heirens who was then on
parole. After a lengthy review of parole board practices, statutes, regula414. Id.; See also Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373-74, (en banc), (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 950 (1981); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
415. Walsh, 733 F.2d at 476.
416. Id.
417. 729 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 147 (1984). The Heirens court noted that
the opinion was circulated to all the active district court judges. The panel found that "no judge
favored a rehearing en banc on the question of overruling" the 1982 decision.
418. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides, "No state shall . . . pass any . . .ex post facto
law."
419. 668 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982).
420.

(c)

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1003-3-5(c) provides:

The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines that:
(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions
of parole; or
(2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law; or
(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline.

421. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1003-3-5(c)(2).
422. Heirens, 729 F.2d at 457 citing Welsh, 668 F.2d at 331.
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tions and case law 423 prior to 1973, the court reached a conclusion con-

trary to that reached by the Welsh court. Specifically, the Heirens court
found that the parole board could and did consider principles of retributive justice and general deterence in making parole decisions prior to
1973. The Heirens court found that the 1973 law "merely codified prior
law" 424 and disagreed with the Welsh court that pre-1973 parole deci-

sions focused on the prisoner himself, particularly on whether the prisoner was rehabilitated. 4 25 Accordingly, the court held that because
principles of general deterrence and retributive justice had always been
considered, application of the provision to prisoners who had committed
their crimes prior to 1973 would not be disadvantageous to them and
would not violate the ex post facto clause.
In United States ex rel. George v. Lane,426 the seventh circuit held
that the Constitution does not guarantee the right of access to a law library to a defendant who is confined prior to trial and who elects to
defend himself. The court consequently reversed the district court's finding that a defendant who elects to proceed pro se must be given access to
427
a law library.
In George, the petitioner was charged initially with burglary and forgery. After changing his plea and choice of counsel on numerous occasions, George finally decided to proceed pro se to trial on a forgery
charge. He elected to represent himself even though the trial judge, on
numerous occasions, had warned him of the inherent problems in proceeding pro se and had recommended that he exercise his right to appointed counsel.
When George later motioned for access to a law library, the judge
refused his request. However, the judge did provide George with access
to materials through the public defender's office. The judge had already
assured George access to an assistant public defender who would represent him if George changed his mind.
Following his trial, George was convicted of forgery. On appeal, the
Illinois Appellate Court rejected his argument that he should have been
423. See People v. Nowak, 387 Ill. 11, 55 N.E.2d 63, 65 cert. denied, 323 U.S. 745 (1944) (Executive pardons and parole board decisions are made "in the interests of society and his discipline,
education and reformation of the one convicted." Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.
1 (1979) (Parole decisions are based on what is best for the individual and the community. Considerations include whether the "inmate's release will minimize the gravity of the offense, weaken the
deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of justice.")
424. Heirens, 729 F.2d at 463.
425. Id. at 458 citing Welsh, 668 F.2d at 330.
426. 718 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1983).
427. No. 81 C 2085 (N.D. Il.1983).
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prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. In addition,
prison authorities must help convicted prisoners prepare and file legal
papers by "providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law." '43 3 In Faretta,the Court recognized that the sixth amendment provides a "right of self representation" which allows a defendant to refuse representation by counsel and to
434
conduct his own defense instead.

The Seventh Circuit, however, found that neither case supported the
petitioners' argument that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant,
who elects to proceed pro se, the right of access to a law library. In
distinguishing Bounds, the court adopted the reasoning of United States
v. Chartman.43 5 In Chartman, the Fourth Circuit held that to the extent
that Bounds is applicable, the sixth amendment is satisfied when the government offers a defendant the assistance of counsel even though it is
declined. The Seventh Circuit also found no basis in Faretta to support
the petitioner's argument. Here, the court quoted from United States v.
Wilson. 4 36 In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit found that Faretta provided no
support for the proposition that, once a defendant elects to defend himself, the sixth amendment "implies further rights to materials, facilities,
or investigative or educational resources that might aid self4 37
representation."
Thus while observing that the trial court judge "did everything in
her power to protect and balance the rights of all parties involved, '4 38
the court held that "the offer of court-appointed counsel to represent a
defendant satisfies the constitutional obligation of a state under the sixth
and fourteenth Amendments" 439 and fulfilled the guidelines set forth in
Bounds.4 0
VII.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of the 1983-84 term of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals brought many criminal law developments worth noting. In analyzing several federal statutes, the court extended the concepts of federal
jurisdiction in cases involving U.S. funds and property. The meanings of
"possession" and "intent" were also expanded, but the court's construc433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Rounds,430 U.S. at 828.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832.
584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 205 (1983).
690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1271.
George, 718 F.2d at 232.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 233.
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and fourteenth Amendments '
Bounds.440

439

VII.

and fulfilled the guidelines set forth in

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of the 1983-84 term of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals brought many criminal law developments worth noting. In analyzing several federal statutes, the court extended the concepts of federal
jurisdiction in cases involving U.S. funds and property. The meanings of
"possession" and "intent" were also expanded, but the court's construction of intent arose in a poorly reasoned opinion and its continued validity is questionable. In fourth amendment cases, the court's position on
warrantless searches was, in general, to expand government powers in
automobile searches and under the plain view exception, but its philosophy on when an airport search becomes an unreasonable seizure is inconclusive, as the four major airport search cases were decided narrowly on
the facts of the individual cases.
Relatively little was added to the body of case law under the fifth,
sixth, and eighth amendments. Although both double jeopardy and entrapment defenses were considered, no new developments resulted. In
sixth amendment related cases, defendants advanced many novel arguments, but apart from a clarification of the Speedy Trial Act, no new
ground was broken. Similarly, in several prisoners' rights cases, the
court denied attempts to expand eighth amendment rights.

439. Id. at 231.
440. Id. at 233.

